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ABSTRACT 
 
American Suppliers: The Role of Americans in the Perpetuation and Maintenance of the 
Postwar Black Market in Germany. (December 2011) 
Micheal Joseph Fasulo, B.A., University of Maryland Baltimore County  
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Jason Parker 
 
Americans are curiously absent from the literature as forces in the black market 
prevailing in Germany after World War II. Aside from Rundell’s study of failed 
currency control policy during the Second World War and the subsequent occupations of 
Germany and Japan, historians have failed to accord the American presence on the black 
market its proper status. They receive mention in narrative fashion, authors noting that 
Americans could make money on the black market, or relating a story about what a 
soldier bought or sold there. Then, like bit players in a movie, Americans recede from 
view, and Germans and displaced persons resume their places in the lead.  
This thesis has two objectives. Through support from the archival record, first, it 
demonstrates that Americans did in fact execute a specific function with respect to the 
maintenance and perpetuation of the black market—they were the market’s suppliers. 
Second, by positing this role, this thesis attempts to correct a view of the black market as 
an essentially German experience, populated in the main by Germans and displaced 
persons. In so doing, I posit a schema of American illicit supply to Germans and 
displaced persons. This thesis argues that Americans operated as suppliers of illicit 
  
iv
goods to the indigenous population. This supply occurred in three ways: Americans 
selling on the black market; misappropriation of materiel (usually food); and theft of 
goods from American installations. Furthermore, each type of supply was predicated 
upon the fulfillment of a certain condition. Americans sold on the black market when 
they were certain they could make a profit. Americans misappropriated US government 
property (usually food) as a consequence of a relationship with a German or displaced 
person; in practice, because those with access to American goods were young men, the 
relationships were only with women, and always included some gradation of intimacy. 
Germans and displaced persons committed larceny from American installations to 
procure goods for the black market, which insured handsome profits. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Laura Hilton writes that during the immediate postwar years “…many Germans saw 
illicit trade as an outside attempt to destabilize their war-torn society.”  Despite this 
perception, in the societal upheaval subsequent to the end of the Second World War, 
Germans resorted to the black market, the illicit economy, to meet their material needs, 
attempting to cope with a licit economy that could provide neither basic household 
necessities nor food.  The literature has presented the black market as a symbol of 
societal disorder, collapse, and deterioration in postwar Germany.  Its existence provided 
a daily reminder to Germans that their society lacked law and order.  Even as Germans 
decried the operation of the black markets in their midst, they found themselves buying 
and selling on these same markets simply to survive, and some Germans and foreign 
displaced persons living in Germany, leveraged the black market in pursuit of profit.  
Scholars have presented the postwar black market as an operation controlled, negotiated, 
and mediated by Germans and displaced persons.1   
Yet, notwithstanding the great number of Germans and displaced persons who 
had resort to the black market daily, chasing calories for survival, there is a kernel of 
truth in Hilton’s comment on the notion of an “outside” force.  Petra Goedde has noted 
the importance of American rations and Post Exchange luxuries in the existence of the 
black market in occupied Germany.  Occupation by American forces entailed food 
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1
 Laura Hilton, “The Black Market in History and Memory: German Perceptions of Victimhood from 
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rations, cigarettes, and an abundance of equipment necessary to the long-term 
maintenance of an army.  The Americans brought abundance to a land beset by want.  It 
is hardly a surprise that American cigarettes became a de facto currency, supplanting a 
worthless Reichsmark as a medium of choice for black market transactions.  The rise of 
the American cigarette as the preferred currency for black market transactions is 
eloquent testimony to the presence of Americans, and proliferation of American goods, 
on the black market.  Scholars acknowledge the presence of Americans in this illicit 
economy, but the GI and the American civilian are not accorded a role in the 
maintenance of the postwar black market.2   
This thesis has two objectives.  First, it demonstrates that Americans did in fact 
execute a specific function with respect to the maintenance and perpetuation of the black 
market—they were the market’s suppliers.  Second, by positing this role, this thesis 
attempts to correct a view of the black market as an essentially German experience, 
populated in the main by Germans and displaced persons.  In so doing, I posit a schema 
of American illicit supply to Germans and displaced persons.  This thesis argues that 
Americans operated as suppliers of illicit goods to the indigenous population.  This 
supply occurred in three ways: Americans selling on the black market; misappropriation 
of materiel (usually food); and theft of goods from American installations.   
Furthermore, each type of supply was predicated upon the fulfillment of a certain 
condition.  Americans sold on the black market when they were certain they could make 
a profit.  Americans misappropriated US government property (usually food) as a 
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consequence of a relationship with a German or displaced person; in practice, because 
those with access to American goods were young men, the relationships were only with 
women, and always included some gradation of intimacy.  Germans and displaced 
persons committed larceny from American installations to procure goods for the black 
market, which insured handsome profits.  This thesis is not an analysis of the dynamics 
of the postwar black market in Germany as an economic phenomenon; rather, it is a 
discussion of the circumstances in which individuals made a decision to resort to the 
conduct of illicit trading.  With regard to the supply schema articulated in this study, the 
chapters on the black market and misappropriation are concerned with Americans, and 
that on larceny from American installations is concerned with Germans and displaced 
persons. 
One of the first historical studies engaging the black market that obtained in 
postwar Europe, and especially in Germany, was Walter Rundell’s 1964 study of the 
American Army’s efforts in currency control policy.  Rundell examined the development 
and implementation of policy rather than the organization and development of the black 
market in Europe.  He demonstrates that effective postwar control policy was a 
pipedream well before the end of the war, and that conditions on the ground following 
the cessation of hostilities exacerbated black-market currency exchange. Rundell argues 
that the blame for rampant speculation in currency exchange lay squarely with the Army.  
In Europe, during the war, the Army did not regulate currency transmission, instead 
attacking exchange violations piecemeal.  Controlling transmission, whether by limiting 
remittance amounts for money orders or instituting an approved nonconvertible 
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currency, would have abated black market activity.  Furthermore, Rundell writes, the 
civil affairs branch of the military prevented armies from prohibiting the use of 
indigenous currencies, “fearing a disparity between the value of reichsmarks and Allied 
military marks.”  Thus, the Army was forced to accept illegally-acquired currency, but 
could not “protect itself” from disbursement of excess funds.3   
Ultimately, the Allied Control Council decided to use an identical currency, 
leading to a glut of Allied mark currency from Russian troops in Germany; since “Army 
finance officers had to convert all types of marks into dollar credits, any attempt at 
currency control became futile.”  In postwar Germany, Rundell argues that the resistance 
of higher echelons to currency restriction made a bad situation worse.  General Dwight 
Eisenhower militated against currency restriction for the sake of his soldiers, arguing 
that currency exchanges favorable to local currencies, especially in friendly countries, 
diminished the purchasing value of the dollar.  A currency card required only that a 
soldier justify the reason for any excess funds, and commanding officers, Rundell 
argues, were lax in approval standards.  In attempting to control the black market, rather 
than attempt actual currency regulation, the Army facilitated black market activity 
among its personnel.  Only with the introduction of military scrip in September 1946, 
argues Rundell, was currency control successful.4  
In 1975, Earl Ziemke published what remains the definitive study of the U.S. 
Army in the postwar occupation of Germany.  While it is, primarily, a narrative history, 
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it is the best distillation of the contents of Record Group 260, the records of the 
American Occupation, that has ever been attempted.  Ziemke’s was the first work of 
American military history of the end of the European war to prize the experience of 
occupation over combat operations.  Policy crafting and implementation are the central 
subjects of his work.  Ziemke discusses the development of European Civil Affairs 
Division units, and the creation of a military government school at the University of 
Virginia.  Concomitant with these steps was the publishing of a manual for military 
government.  Once entry into Germany was imminent, these units were attached to 
combat teams and subsequently established local government within the compass of the 
combat unit’s operations.  After the war, a proper military government for the American 
Zone was established, the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS).  
There was tension between the local authority exercised by the tactical combat military 
government detachments and the pronouncements emanating from OMGUS.  Ziemke 
ends his account in June 1946 because the occupation, while still buttressed by the 
military, transferred from the Army to a civilian-staffed OMGUS.5 
 On balance, Ziemke considers the Army’s role in the occupation a success.  
While denazification proved to be an ill-conceived policy, Ziemke credits ECAD units 
and OMGUS with the creation of a viable democracy.  The Army achieved this by 
establishing a range of Nazi party alternatives and quickly holding elections, so that 
Germans held effective local rule by 1946.  The American occupation was as well-
executed as could be expected; the Germans reassumed control of local and state 
                                                 
5
  Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington, D.C.: Center of 
Military History, United States Army, 1975). 
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government, saw their art and historical treasures protected, and received the help of 
OMGUS civil affairs teams in maintaining law and order and public health.  Ziemke 
asserts that this was the best possible outcome for a defeated enemy.  As a source, it is 
an invaluable primer on the American occupation experience, though it includes only a 
cursory discussion of the black market, in references to currency control and an extended 
discussion of food shortages. 
Given the ubiquity of the black market as a part of postwar life, despite the role 
of the Americans in supplying and perpetuating the illicit economy, the black market is 
generally conceptualized in the literature as a construct and experience of Germans and 
displaced persons.  Manfred Enssle, in his study of food scarcity in postwar Stuttgart, 
argues that the struggle of food scarcity “dominated everyday life until the aftermath of 
the currency reform in the fall of 1948.”  To overcome privation, Stuttgarters developed 
multiple strategies for survival amidst scarcity, and this experience led to the cultivation 
of values and skills necessary for the revival of the German economy.  Surveying the 
black market in the Soviet sector of postwar Berlin, Joerg Roesler contends that the 
attempts of the Socialist Unity Party to control the black market through punitive 
measures, such as raids and special courts, failed as Berliners resorted to the black 
market in response to postwar shortages.  Only the introduction of “free trade” shops in 
1948, selling high quality, formerly-rationed goods at below-black market prices, ended 
the grip of the illicit economy in East Berlin.  As prices fell in these shops from 1948 
through 1951, workers had access to cheap goods without the twofold risk of legal 
sanctions and shoddy merchandise.  Enssle and Roesler developed the idea within the 
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historiography of the centrality of food shortages in perpetuating the postwar black 
market, and began to elaborate some of the ways Germans assumed agency in 
controlling their existence despite the strictures of ration and price controls.6 
Petra Goedde’s 2003 study of the occupation attempts to answer how Germany 
transformed itself so completely, in so short a time, from implacable enemy to strong 
ally of the United States.  Previous studies have answered with recourse to political and 
economic factors. Goedde’s work is groundbreaking in that it approaches the question 
from a socio-cultural perspective, giving agency to individuals.  Goedde argues for an 
expanded definition of foreign relations to include not only the negotiations of 
politicians and diplomats, but also the informal interactions between American GIs and 
German civilians.  Historians have considered the German-American rapprochement a 
result, writes Goedde, “of political expediency.”7   
Goedde’s work joins the history of the cultural and social interactions of 
Americans and Germans to the history of the American occupation as a geopolitical 
project.  Americans encountered a defeated, weak Germany, devoid of men.  
Furthermore, the Germans with whom American men wanted to interact were women.  
These two circumstances led to the construction of a feminized and infantilized 
Germany, creating a stark contrast between Germany’s gentle and pacific postwar 
demeanor and its masculine, aggressive, bellicose recent past.  Women accepted this 
arrangement because it did not threaten their traditional status in society, while men felt 
                                                 
6
 Manfred J. Enssle, “The Harsh Discipline of Food Scarcity in Postwar Stuttgart, 1945-1948,” German 
Studies Review 10:3 (October, 1987), 481-502; Jorg Roesler, “The Black Market in Post-war Berlin and 
the Methods Used to Counteract It,” German History 7:1 (1989), 92-107. 
7
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8
threatened by the American usurpation of their traditional positions of authority.  The 
selling of democracy, especially to German youth, through sports, music, and the 
establishment of a German youth program, also permitted American men to be role 
models, which German women embraced.  The common cultural bonds between 
Americans and Germans served both to cement feelings of amity and create a cultural 
and emotional gulf between displaced persons and American forces.  Ultimately, 
German men accepted this feminization as the only viable route to international respect, 
and a German perception of victimhood arose, which Americans also adopted, drawing 
the two peoples ever closer.  The Americans came to perceive themselves as protectors 
of Germany, a notion that reached its apotheosis with the Berlin Airlift.  In this way, 
argues Goedde, German-American conciliation was a cause of the Cold War, rather than 
a consequence.8   .           
In 2004, Stephen Fritz published a study of the final months of the Third Reich, 
and the disorder and societal upheaval that rose in its wake.  Fritz argues that National 
Socialist ideology created a society that whose members saw their death and defeat as an 
ultimate expression of loyalty to the state, engendering a wellspring of resistance which 
allowed the Nazis to control Germans even as Americans and Russians were moving 
through Germany.  In the ensuing upheaval of occupation, Germans became reconciled 
to the occupation not through the policy directives of OMGS, but through their 
interactions and relationships with GIs and displaced persons.  As the threat of guerrilla 
warfare receded, and German men accepted fraternization, both Americans and Germans 
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 Goedde, xiii-xxii, 39-41, 126, 147-165, 195-198, 200-208. 
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discovered they had much in common, and the two groups arrayed themselves against 
displaced persons.  The bedraggled and filthy displaced persons, crowded in DP camps, 
observing Germans accorded benign treatment and freedom, lashed out against 
Americans and Germans through numerous small acts of violence and camp riots.9   
According to Fritz, the black market became, to both Germans and American 
military government personnel, a foreign, displaced person problem; raids of camps, 
known to be loci of black market trade, reinforced the idea that displaced persons had 
brought the black market to Germany.  The fact that the camps provided bases for 
trading in the open, and were discrete locations easily accessible to American “search 
and seizure” operations, created the impression that displaced persons, often Poles, 
constituted the root of the black market menace and a majority of its operators.  Fritz 
asserts that with all this trouble, Americans “emotionally distanced” themselves from the 
communities of displaced persons, and found a welcome respite in the efficiency, 
cleanliness, and cooperation of the Germans.10   
Also in 2004, Malte Zierenberg published a study of the evolution and conduct of 
wartime black marketeering in Berlin.  Zierenberg argues that this black market grew out 
of meat rationing in 1941 and the Allied bombing offensive of 1943, which resulted in 
food shortages that forced Germans to “organize” for “their own consumption.”  
Experience with inflation and destabilization after the First World War taught German 
authorities the importance of insuring that buying and selling occur lawfully, and on the 
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official economy; as a consequence, the Third Reich implemented price and ration 
controls that incurred more shortage and left more Germans with recourse to the black 
market.  Zierenberg argues further that the black market provided visible evidence of 
disorder, collapse, and defeat; this led to angry reactions to public black marketeering 
and the search for a scapegoat.  In the absence of a Jewish population, Germans fixed 
upon foreigners in the discourse of the wartime black market.  Foreigners were 
criminals, charging exorbitant prices on the black market while “honest” Germans went 
to work; police blotters were filled with complaints about foreigners engaged in illicit 
bartering and price inflation in the sale of rationed goods.  Hence, a corresponding 
morality emerged: German operation on the black market was a matter of survival, but 
foreign operation was exploitative and criminal; Germans were victims of the 
aggrandizing Poles and Czechs.11 
Elaborating upon the groundwork laid by Enssle and Roesler, Paul Steege’s 2007 
study of postwar Berlin is an examination of everyday life in the defeated city.  Steege 
imbues Berliners—indeed, postwar Germans—with an agency not previously accorded 
to them; crushed by defeat, eking out marginal existences on the ration card, gouged by 
schieberei on the black market, their movement and their rights controlled by occupying 
powers, Steege argues that they still managed to take charge of their own survival amidst 
the chaos.  Steege’s work is a counterpoint to the idea that the Cold War was “imposed” 
from above, and that it ought best be told from the perspective of American and Soviet 
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policies, weapons, and struggles in the international system.  Steege disputes the notion 
that Berliners were passive, mere pawns in a contest of superpowers; Berliners dealt the 
Soviets a very public blow in defeating the Socialist Unity Party in 1946, they organized 
a railroad strike and undermined Soviet authority during the blockade of 1948, and they 
bartered and bought, both to live and to prosper, on the black market when the 
quadripartite authority in Berlin failed to meet basic needs while arrogating to itself the 
right to determine the future of the city and its inhabitants.12   
Steege argues that in negotiating survival strategies, “informed” Berliners faced 
“individual choices” “in an effort to cope with the scarcity they faced.”  In reasserting 
Berliners’ agency, Steege’s work demonstrates how they “participated in shaping the 
very places within which they negotiated their economic and material survival, including 
those that remained technically illegal.”  Berliners realized their agency in deciding to 
operate on (or avoid) the black market, to buy or sell goods, to forage, or to survive on 
the ration card—even to stay in bed to conserve energy constituted an affirmative 
decision vis-à-vis a family’s survival amid scarcity.  The black market that Steege 
constructs is a location maintained and controlled by Germans, a location (or locations) 
where Germans negotiated the terms of their survival notwithstanding the proclamations 
of General Clay or the ukases of General Sokolovskii.13 
In 2007, Atina Grossman published Jews, Germans, and Allies, a study of the 
experience of Jewish displaced persons in postwar, occupied Germany.  Grossman 
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locates her study in the American zone, specifically the American sector in Berlin and 
the DP camps in Bavaria, because the American zone received the largest influx of 
Jewish survivors at war’s end.  Grossman uses the locale of Berlin to examine German 
perceptions of victimhood in the wake of the war, whether as victims of Allied bombing, 
postwar privation, the dictates of OMGUS, or unscrupulous foreigners working the black 
market.  Grossman highlights German unwillingness to acknowledge how this sense of 
victimhood was achieved, that is, how the conditions they were bemoaning came to be.  
They almost refused to be “remorseful about their own agency or responsibility.”  
Americans who boosted Germany’s will to survive inculcated in the Germans a “mood 
of self-pity,” victims not only of the privations and depredations afforded the defeated, 
but also of the Nazi party, with Hitler’s rhetoric and the party-driven contrivance of mass 
spectacle.14   
Grossman sees Americans as a mediating force between Jews and Germans, and 
this study’s focus is the competing claims of victimhood put forth by Jewish displaced 
persons and Germans.  Americans favored those in the DP camps, who received access 
to American goods and a higher daily calorie allotment than the German population; 
this, of course, made them prime sites for black market activity—a black market to 
which Germans had resort.  Germans resented the special treatment accorded the Jewish 
displaced persons, reiterating the German perception of victimization; they also blamed 
the displaced persons for the rampant black market.  The displaced persons, having 
survived the Holocaust, resented German claims of hardship tantamount to the 
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experience of blatant anti-Semitism, forced relocation, and calculated genocide.  
Grossman demonstrates that both groups participated on the black market and contrived 
mutually beneficial working relationships in the course of their transactions.15 
 Laura Hilton examines the black market as a locus for German perceptions of 
victimization during the postwar period.  Echoing Zierenberg’s assertion, Hilton 
contends that the black market constituted a very visible sign of disorder in postwar 
Germany.  Germans could not escape the disorder evinced by ubiquitous black market 
activity, so they attempted to rationalize it by creating categories of acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior.  A sense of shared German victimhood was not the result of the 
war, but rather, the privations and dislocations of the first postwar years.  In 1948, 
currency reform, the consequent end of the black market as a central economic force, 
and the mass exodus of displaced persons (especially Jews), reinforced the notion that 
the displaced person bore responsibility for the black market.16   
Both American military government and the German public came to view DP 
camps and their inhabitants as propagators of black marketeering.  This served to 
reinforce German perceptions of victimhood played out on the black market.  However, 
Germans participated in far greater numbers than either displaced persons or the 
American occupation forces, mostly for food and other subsistence goods.  The illegal 
bartering, foraging, and small-time buying and selling of the German was seen as moral 
and necessary given the dire circumstances of existence, but Germans refused to accord 
a similar consideration for the displaced persons, or countenance why they were in 
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Germany in the first place.  Hilton asserts that this allowed Germans to maintain their 
notion of shared victimhood—they were at the mercy of unscrupulous displaced persons 
and profit-hungry Americans.  There was a patent inconsistency with respect to the 
existence of ubiquitous black market activity in the German population and the German 
public’s perception and memory of the black market in the postwar years.17 
 The historiography, as a rule, contends that the black market was a German 
experience, if only because it has heavily favored examinations of the ways in which 
Germans dealt with defeat and lived through a period of great societal upheaval.  There 
is a prominent but somewhat ancillary role for displaced persons.  Germans and 
displaced persons negotiated daily the terms of participation on this market, mediating 
with each other for their survival or a chance for small luxuries, or in the case of the 
schieberei, the accumulation of wealth.  Steege writes that “Whether in the ration office, 
the grocery store, or the black market, Berliners challenged, worked, and subverted the 
“system” that presumed to control their daily lives.”  Berliners crafted strategies of 
survival, decided what constituted a morally justifiable level of involvement with the 
black market, and did not simply respond to their straitened circumstances--they found 
ways to mitigate them.  Germans created the market, Germans used the market as they 
saw fit, and Germans changed the market to fit the exigencies of individual 
circumstance.  As early as 1985, Douglas Botting referred tellingly to “the German black 
market,” emphasizing the importance of who used and operated the market, instead of 
using the phrase “the black market in Germany,” which would emphasize the geographic 
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extent and location of the market.  The postwar black market was a German 
phenomenon.18 
 Americans are curiously absent from the literature as forces in the black market.  
Aside from Rundell’s study of failed currency control policy during the Second World 
War and the subsequent occupations of Germany and Japan, historians have failed to 
accord the American presence on the black market its proper status.  They receive 
mention in narrative fashion, authors noting that Americans could make money on the 
black market, or relating a story about what a soldier bought or sold there.   Then, like 
bit players in a movie, Americans recede from view, and Germans and displaced persons 
resume their places in the lead.  To Fritz, Americans were notable for their attempts to 
quash the black market.  Grossman sees the Americans as intermediaries between 
Germans and displaced persons.  Hilton makes a passing comment that Americans were 
consistent players in the black market, and then discusses the attempts of the military 
government to control black marketeering.  The idea of the “bit player” is useful in 
explaining why the literature does not accord Americans a systematic role in the 
functioning of the black market, and in the context of the third chapter, how and why 
stealing constituted a type of American illicit supply.  This thesis, then, is also an 
attempt to give Americans a space on the black market.  As early as 1975, Earl Ziemke 
recognized the correlation between the imposition of an American occupation and the 
proliferation of foodstuffs on the black market.  Chapter one uses the experience of 
American merchant seamen in Bremerhaven to argue that black marketeering as a form 
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of illicit supply was predicated upon the ability to make a profit.  Chapter two 
demonstrates that misappropriation as a form of illicit supply can best be understood in 
the context of food scarcity and fraternization between American men and German 
women.  Chapter three demonstrates that larceny from American installations as a form 
of illicit supply was contingent upon the potential value stolen goods maintained on the 
black market.  The argument set forth in this thesis articulates a systemic function for 
American GIs and civilians in the operation and regulation of the postwar illicit 
economy that obtained in Germany.  With respect to the historiographical conclusion 
that Germans constructed a shared sense of victimhood, this thesis suggests that, insofar 
as this victimhood implicated Americans on the black market, the victimizers were 
unwitting and the victimization was inevitable.19  
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CHAPTER II 
 
AMERICAN SUPPLIERS: BLACK MARKET 
 
In the early morning hours of July 21, 1945, members of the United States Forces, 
European Theater (USFET) executed an aggressive 48-hour search and check operation, 
codenamed TALLY-HO.  Within the American Zone of occupied Germany, hundreds of 
thousands of US soldiers searched German homes and businesses, swept through 
apartment buildings, and stopped Germans on foot and on bicycle.  But TALLY-HO 
called for the search of American military personnel as well.  American officers were 
asked to present papers in public, units participating in the operation searched enlisted 
men’s barracks and mess halls.  Soldiers checked equipment depots for missing materiel, 
contraband, and suspicious caches of goods fungible on the black market.20 
 Planners at USFET Headquarters conceived TALLY-HO both as a security 
control measure, and as a means to establish an American presence within the newly-
instituted zone of occupation.  The total strength of the units participating in TALLY-
HO is not given in the after action report, but it specifies that 163,590 GIs participated in 
the Seventh Army’s sector alone.  The objectives of TALLY-HO were threefold.   First, 
the operation enabled a “meticulous check of credentials of all persons,” both German 
civilians and Allied military personnel.  Second, the search permitted the uncovering of 
prohibited articles and the “illegal possession of property of the United States 
government, and to insure suitable confiscation and disposition thereof.”  This objective 
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did not per se constitute a concern for the presence of a black market; rather it provided 
for the seizure of contraband threatening the security of the American Zone.  The items 
uncovered during the search included ammunition, small arms, radio transmitters, 
grenades, and panzerfausts.  In the months following the surrender of German forces, 
Allied forces feared a recrudescence of Nazi activity, besides confronting the anarchy 
and crime rampant in a defeated Germany.  The contraband goods could be used to 
continue resistance activities vis-à-vis the Allied occupation, most notably in the form of 
the dreaded Werewolves, or could find their way to the roving groups of displaced 
persons (DPs) seeking food—and revenge—in the wake of the German collapse.  
Besides the pressing security concerns these articles presented, the contrabands were 
also fungible in black market transactions.21 
 The third objective of TALLY-HO was the detection of black market activity, 
and the prosecution of those civilians and Allied personnel found to be operating within 
it.  Because the Reichsmark was worthless as currency, goods became the only fungible 
form of exchange, and barter replaced fixed prices paid in currency as the accepted 
means of exchange. The black market prevented stabilization of the German economy: it 
promoted inflation, devalued official currency to the point of worthlessness, prevented 
the transfer of value growth experienced in the black market to the licit economy, 
created incentives for theft and robbery, and encouraged the formation of sub rosa 
specialty markets engaged in crime—prostitution, arms trading, the selling of currency 
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below market rates—along with the security risks presented by the appearance of gangs 
dedicated to black market operations.  TALLY-HO was designed in part to snuff out the 
inchoate operations of the nascent black market rising amidst the chaos of postwar 
Germany.22 
 TALLY-HO revealed that the black market in Germany was pervasive but 
inchoate.  The operation discovered 24 German civilians operating on the black market.  
However, 3,495 civilians were in possession of contraband articles or United States 
property.  Germans had taken possession of large quantities of gasoline, weapons, and 
rations.  With regard to materiel actually destined for the black market, listed, inter alia, 
were “1200 new aeroplane tires,” “600 pounds of sugar and 5 tons of cheese found in a 
church in Passau,” “300 pairs of civilian shoes found at #9 Karnerstrasse, Bensheim, in 
the Seventh Army area,” and two German medical officers and two interpreters 
apprehended taking food from a hospital for sale to black market operators.  Portions of 
the total seizure, including US property, prohibited goods, and goods destined for the 
black market, were held by GIs.  The author of the after action report, Brigadier General 
Edwin Sibert, surmised that the evidence, taken as a whole, indicated the presence of 
“widespread but scattered black market operation throughout the United States zone.”  In 
the conclusion, Sibert confounded his prior assessment: “The fact that no large-scale 
black market exists in the United States zone was established.”23 
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This chapter is an examination of the nature and operation of the postwar black 
market in Bremerhaven, Germany.  The events recounted here took place in the summer 
of 1946, with a separate reference to an incident in late spring of 1946.  This study of the 
Bremerhaven black market occurs within the framework of an Inspector General’s 
investigation of alleged military police malfeasance and misfeasance at the Bremerhaven 
docks.  The Bremerhaven allegations are presented chronologically, in order of the date 
of the offense or the bringing of charges.  The crew of the SS Marine Perch lodged most 
of the accusations, and this was mainly an investigation of those complaints, but crew 
members of other ships that docked at Bremerhaven proffered further allegations, and 
these, and their resolutions, were included in the record.  The record clearly 
demonstrates that the military police, as directed by the OPMG, were both following 
orders and exercising only that authority delegated to them.  The complaints of the 
merchant seamen—excessive roughness, humiliating searches, abusive language, undue 
fines, and pilferage—were found to be baseless.  This author concurs with the final 
assessment.  That said, it is reasonable that an individual seaman might take offense that 
his apple was confiscated on the way into town; transcripts of interrogations of those 
involved with providing security on the docks and criminal investigation—members of 
the Counter Intelligence Corps of the US Army—in Bremerhaven sometimes reveal 
sympathy for the seamen.  This consideration notwithstanding, the sum of these 
particular incidents renders a clear picture: the merchant seamen consistently operated in 
the black market, which undermined Allied control of the licit economy, promoted 
crime, and could retard German economic growth.  The investigation belies the assertion 
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of Edwin Sibert that no large-scale black market existed in Germany.  The Bremerhaven 
episode demonstrates both the growth of the black market from its admittedly 
“scattered” state in 1945, during TALLY-HO, and the place of the merchant seaman in 
supplying this shadow economy.  In the end, this chapter demonstrates that the impetus 
for this form of American illicit supply of goods was predicated upon the ability and 
desire of the merchant seamen to make a profit; in the absence of profit, there would be 
no cigarettes, and a severely contracted economy, suffering from a lack of currency (in 
the form of cigarettes) would result.24    
 Certainly, in the weeks and months immediately following the fall of the Nazi 
regime, there could be no large-scale organized black market.  Eight million starved and 
angry DPs posed a severe security concern, German civilians and US troops alike 
engaged in looting, and people were more concerned with their own survival.  During 
the summer of 1945, where six weeks before SS patrols were conducting sham courts 
and on-the-spot executions for traitorous behavior, now Germans faced the depredations 
of DPs and disease, and the looming spectre of starvation.  Allied troops had not yet 
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settled into occupation duty.  Even the black market required a modicum of societal 
stability to function as a coherent network and as an engine of economic growth.  
However, Sibert’s ultimate contention that, in July of 1945, an extended black market 
did not exist in the American Zone of occupation rings false.  Sugar, cheese, pistols, 
gasoline, and shoes surely had buyers, or else GIs and German civilians would not steal 
caches, or stockpile contraband in abandoned farms and warehouses.25  Sibert could not 
know that black market growth would explode in the coming years of occupation.  
Indeed, in September 1945, black market proliferation into the reach and value of the 
licit economy was enough of a concern that General Dwight Eisenhower issued an 
outright ban on any troop participation in any form of the black market.  The first article 
stated the rationale of the order “Troop Participation in the Black Market”, AG 383 
GEC-AGO, 
1. This theater is faced with a serious and difficult black market problem 
which constitutes a distinct menace to the United States control of the 
German economy, is directly in conflict with the United States objective 
of maintaining law and order, promotes inflation and encourages theft and 
robbery.26 
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However, in one part of the American Zone, the black market was small—the 
Bremen Enclave.  TALLY-HO totals for search and check in the enclave were: 52 of 
2,747 small arms, 1 of 1,260 grenades, and 42 of 2,658 miscellaneous items.  No 
German civilian in the enclave possessed US property.  The Bremen Enclave counted for 
47 of 3,008 German civilians in possession of contraband items.  None of the items 
enumerated as bound for the black market was seized in the enclave.  Three cities 
constituted the Bremen Enclave, so the “small” black market was proportional to the size 
of the enclave; however, the limited extent of territory under US control, and the limited 
incidences of possession of contraband and black market-bound goods, augured well for  
future efforts in suppressing the black market within the enclave.  The enclave’s location 
on the North Sea made it a key locus for the import and export of goods, the entry of 
men and materiel for the occupation, and the transfer of the mails between the United 
States, Great Britain, and the Continent.27 
Unfortunately, the concern expressed in “Troop Participation in the Black 
Market” proved to be prescient.  Bremerhaven quickly became a source of fodder for the 
black market, as goods flowed from the United States and Britain to occupied Germany, 
and American soldiers carried luxury items or private mail (flouting regulations 
prohibiting the same) from Germans out of Germany.  Given the port’s status as an entry 
point for supplies, merchant seamen became enthusiastic participators in the black 
market operating from Bremerhaven.  Merchant seamen were often in port for less than a 
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week and traveled frequently to the United States and other European ports; they 
returned to the same ports frequently in the course of their travels.  This enabled them 
access to American goods, luxury items, and curiosities purchased in other European 
destinations.  Armed with dollars and easy access to Hershey’s chocolate, fresh fruit, 
brassieres, and cigarettes, the merchant seaman was exquisitely well-positioned to 
exploit the black market in Germany. 
Throughout the American Zone, military police enforced the prohibition on troop 
participation in the black market.  As a branch of the Office of the Provost Marshal 
General (OPMG), military police enforced regulations on bases and provided law and 
order on the ground in occupied territories.  This wide bailiwick even included 
provisions for traffic control in captured towns.  They searched military personnel and 
civilians for contraband and US government property.  MPs checked credentials, 
determining whether a given person should possess a ration card, or have access to the 
Post Exchange.  The military police corps often had authority to establish summary 
courts to try soldiers charged with crimes.  In the port city of Bremerhaven, military 
police furnished dock security, and enforced AG 383 and the sundry orders at lower 
levels emanating from it.  At the docks, the military police and the merchant seamen 
worked at cross-purposes.  The MP was charged with enforcing the black market-
participation prohibition promulgated by USFET Headquarters, while it was decidedly in 
the interest of merchant seamen to carry luxury items and US dollars off the 
Bremerhaven docks and into town.  Such confrontations were bound to cause frustration, 
resentment, and confusion for both parties.  During the summer of 1946 in Bremerhaven, 
  
25
this mélange of bad feelings precipitated allegations, from several merchant seamen, of 
mistreatment at the hands of the local military police corps. 
The earliest recorded instance of alleged malpractice on the part of the military 
police at Bremerhaven is the case of one George Polden of the SS Bernard Carter.  His 
file as a part of the Bremerhaven investigation is not complete, but there is enough 
available to show that it occurred during the spring of 1946.  On May 22nd, 1946, the 
War Shipping Administration requested information from the OPMG concerning the 
treatment of members of the Merchant Marine, apparently prompted by an incident 
involving Polden, and the Provost Marshal sent for information from USFET.  On 
August 15, 1946, Colonel Francis Howard of the OPMG’s Military Police Division 
replied to the WSA that “present conditions warrant the necessity for searching officers 
and seamen of the Merchant Marine in connection with the control of black market 
activities.”  Apparently as early as the spring of 1946, control of the Bremerhaven black 
market had become a distinct problem.28 
The earliest recorded Bremerhaven military police complaint for which there is a 
complete record in the Inspector General’s investigation is Gabriel Agos’s allegations of 
malfeasance on July 29,1946.  On July 28th, Agos, a merchant seaman of the SS George 
Washington, attempted to bring ashore five packs of cigarettes and five candy bars.  At 
the dock gates, Agos was stopped by an MP and searched, whereupon the MP escorted 
Agos to his headquarters and Agos signed “certain papers” and a single pack of 
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cigarettes was returned to him.  Agos appeared before the summary court the next day, 
and was fined fifty dollars “mind you this without a trial or explanation.”Agos wrote a 
letter of complaint to the Secretary of War, stating pointedly that  
All I want to ask of you is, if this is the type of justice due to a Soldier of 
this last War, All I asked for was a fair hearing, which was denied to me, 
all I received was European Justice, that which I was told to enlist in the 
army and fight to exterminate, It appears from what I went through that 
we are traveling backwards not forward.29 
The record of the investigation and trial proceedings paints a different picture.  It 
shows a regular process—search, charges, booking, court appearance, sentence and 
payment of fines—executed in a transparent manner.  There is a receipt for a fine of fifty 
dollars, with a copy directed to Gabriel Agos.  A charge sheet indicates that one Private 
William Foster searched the accused, and that the incriminating evidence included “5 
pks. of cigarettes and 4 candy bars.”  The specification sheet states that Agos “did 
attempt to smuggle 5 pks of cigarettes and 4 candy bars from the 17th Port area 
[Bremerhaven], contrary to the 17th Major Port regulations.  AG250.2(P1) dtd 1st July 
1946.”  The letter which Agos wrote to Secretary of War Robert Patterson initiated an 
investigation, with the OPMG requesting information from the Continental Base 
Command, which in turn requested information from USFET HQ.  USFET HQ 
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requested that the Bremerhaven Adjutant General’s Office investigate the substance of 
Agos’s allegations and pronounce on the validity of his trial.30 
Agos admitted in his letter both that he was aware of the existing regulations and 
that he had violated them.  He wrote 
…under the existing law, I was permitted to take with me two 
packages of unopened cigarettes and one package of opened cigarettes, I 
had with me on my person four packages of unopened and one opened 
package of cigarettes, I also had 5 bars of chocolate, under the law I am 
permitted two bars of same…31 
The AG Office in Bremerhaven seized on this declaration.  The report pointed out that 
his statement “constitutes an admission on his part that he was aware of the regulations 
and that he deliberately violated same.”  Given that he had been advised of his rights and 
had indicated that he was aware he was in violation of the standing regulation, Agos’s 
assertion of an unfair trial was “unjustified.”  Lieutenant Colonel F.W. Marshall, writing 
for the AG Department, noted “In the past, Merchant Seamen have used PX 
commodities extensively to participate in black market operations while ashore.”  The 
limit on the number of items a seaman could carry on his person was intended “to curb 
black market operations.”  The documentary record indicates that Agos’s trial was valid 
and that a bona fide investigation occurred.  Agos knew of the order prohibiting troop 
operations in the black market, and he chose to take ashore cigarettes and candy bars far 
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in excess of what a person might reasonably be expected to smoke and eat for a short 
stay.  While Agos may not have intended to sell his cigarettes and chocolate beyond the 
dock gates, experience would dictate that the military police ought to be suspicious of 
his motives.32 
The SS Marine Perch was a familiar sight at the Bremerhaven docks.  It had 
made frequent stops at the port throughout 1946.  One such call at Bremerhaven 
occurred between August 20 and August 30 of 1946.  The Counter Intelligence Corps 
was required to board each ship and provide masters of ship with both a Summary Court 
Bulletin and Military Orders for merchant seamen; the CIC also furnished to merchant 
seamen passes for leave in Bremerhaven.  During its August stay, the SS Marine Perch 
offloaded 5 American civilians and 57 DPs “in transit”, and took on for its next trip 942 
displaced persons.  CIC agents issued 219 leave passes.  While in port, six members of 
the Marine Perch’s crew were charged, tried, and fined by the summary court established 
by the military police unit operating in Bremerhaven, the 382nd Military Police Battalion 
Company “D”, for various minor offenses.  Most violations were connected with black 
market prohibitions: Cigaro Garcia attempted to take off the Bremerhaven docks three 
packs of cigarettes beyond the allowed amount, Ho Yin four packs, and Pasqualino 
D’Angelo eight packs.  A particularly enterprising seaman, Eddie Lede, attempted to 
sneak into Bremerhaven with “2 pks cigarettes, 2 candy bars, 3 cigars, and one brassier 
[sic] out of the dock area.”33  
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The crew felt sufficiently aggrieved to do more than grumble about its fines and 
treatment at the hands of the military police, and on August 26, 1946, sent a letter to the 
president of the National Maritime Union of Cooks and Stewards, enumerating its 
grievances with the 382nd Military Police Battalion; the Maritime Committee of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations forwarded this letter to the Secretary of War.  The 
letter alleged the following.  First, crew members could carry ashore neither American 
currency nor more than two packs of cigarettes.  Second, crew members were subject “to 
most unceremonious and most humiliating searches as if they were criminals” when 
passing through the dock gates into the city.  Third, military police confiscated dollars 
on their possession whenever they were discovered in the course of a search; the 
complaint intimated that the fine for this breach of regulations was as much as a crew 
member had on his person.  The next complaint alleged that beyond an onerous limit on 
cigarette packs, any packs above the two allowed were subject to confiscation.  The crew 
members believed that the confiscated articles were supposed to go to the Red Cross, but 
they doubted that this occurred, “as their exchange in Germany is too high,” thus 
intimating that the military police were participating in the Bremerhaven black market as 
well.   
The crew next alleged that when MPs would find cigarette packs in excess of the 
permitted number, the summary court assigned “unreasonably high fines” for this 
violation; Ho Yin and Cigaro Garcia each received a $50 fine for three excess packs and 
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Pasqualino D’Angelo received a $75 fine for four excess packs.  The final complaints 
reiterated a concern with searches on the streets of Bremerhaven, particularly in the 
presence of females, charged that merchant seamen were fined for abusive language 
when the military police could swear at crew members with impunity, bemoaned a lack 
of transportation to the larger port city of Bremen, and alleged that merchant seamen 
alone were denied the privilege of frequenting the United States Army Post Exchange 
when all other Allied personnel could buy there.34 
There was no established scale of fines for the type and amount of contraband 
brought ashore, but the fines levied for the offenses committed by Yin, Garcia, and 
D’Angelo indicate at least a modicum of moderation in assessing these fines.  The MPs 
only confiscated cigarette packs in excess of the two permitted, so that, in toto, Yin was 
carrying five packs, Garcia six packs, and D’Angelo ten packs; Yin and Garcia received 
a fine for only three packs and D’Angelo received a fine for four packs, well below the 
eight illicit packs.  Moreover, this allegation indicates that the crew of the Marine Perch 
was aware both of the existence of the black market and the value of the cigarette within 
this illicit economy.  It suggests, but does not prove, that crew members used extra packs 
for the purchase of luxury items in Bremerhaven. 
Concurrent with the writing of the letter endorsed by the entire crew, a few 
merchant seamen took it upon themselves to petition Congress for a redress of 
grievances.  Joseph Costanzo, Nicolaus Boosh, and two anonymous seamen contacted 
                                                 
34
 From “crew members of all departments,” Letter to the president of the National Maritime Union of 
Cooks and Stewards, 8/26/1946, Box 1175; list of offenses and fines accrued by crew members of the SS 
Marine Perch, Box 1175.   
  
31
their respective US senators.  Only Joseph Costanzo affirmatively identified himself as a 
crew member of the SS Marine Perch, but the dates on each letter, the fact that these 
letters were written coevally with the letter endorsed by the crew of the Marine Perch, 
the use of the same form in all letters except for Costanzo’s, and references to 
mistreatment at the hands of the Bremerhaven military police in each letter strongly 
suggest that other merchant seamen on the Marine Perch wrote these missives.  To 
Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, Costanzo wrote, with reference to the 382nd 
Military Police Battalion of Bremerhaven, “The ‘shake down’ of Merchant Seamen both 
physically and financially in this port is deplorable and is in need of your immediate 
investigation.”  Senator Homer Capehart of Indiana received the two letters from the 
anonymous crew members; in the letters, dated August 28th and 29th respectively, the 
seamen remonstrated  
As a seaman who has been in the Merchant Marine Service for the past 
year, I wish to protest against the humiliation and the indignities that we 
suffer at the hands of the military police in the port of Bremerhaven, 
Germany.  The unjust fines we have paid and the manner in which they 
are levied upon us is a disgrace to the American Nation as a whole, and 
are in urgent need of your immediate investigation.35 
Senator Capehart wrote to the Chief of Staff at the War Department that,  “I trust it will 
be your pleasure to direct an investigation of these charges and to take such action as 
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may be necessary to correct any existing conditions which may be improper.”  Nicolaus 
Boosh used the same form in his undated letter to Senator James Huffman of Ohio.36 
 Letters from Senators tend to receive timely attention from Executive 
departments, and the Office of the Provost Marshal General was lively in responding to 
the senatorial requests for information.  Deputy Provost Marshal Colonel A.B. Johnson 
sent off replies to Senators Huffman and Smith on September 10, 1946.  In his reply to 
Smith, Johnson again raised the issue of the black market existing in occupied Germany.   
An investigation conducted at that port during July disclosed considerable 
evidence indicating that officers and seamen of the Merchant Marine 
have contributed greatly to the black market by carrying quantities of post 
exchange supplies and rations from the dock area.  Accordingly, 
instructions were issued by the Port Commander, requiring gate guards to 
search all Merchant Marine personnel for excessive amounts of Army 
property.  Due to existing conditions, this search of personnel is 
considered necessary by the Port Authorities in order to assist in the 
control of black market activities in the European Theater.37 
Johnson’s reply to Huffman regarding Boosh, who had used the form letter, stressed the 
willingness of the OPMG to investigate and correct the exorbitant fines that Boosh 
alleged merchant seamen were forced to pay, but needed more definite information from 
Boosh before it could proceed further.  Capehart sent his inquiry to the War Department 
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rather than to the Office of the Provost Marshal General, and the Secretary of War 
ordered a reply from the Commanding General of the European Theater of Operations, 
United States Army.  General Dwight Eisenhower thanked Capehart for the anonymous 
letters, and forwarded the matter for consideration to General Joseph McNarney, then 
Military Governor of Occupied Germany, who himself replaced Eisenhower when the 
latter assumed command of USFET in November of 1945.  By mid-September of 1946, 
the Provost Marshal General’s Office was fielding requests in multiple incidents for 
further information and remedial action from the Secretary of War, the premier 
American general of the Second World War, three US Senators, and two CIO-affiliated 
union presidents.  Besieged on all sides, the United States Army sent an investigator 
from the Inspector General’s Department to Bremerhaven with orders to investigate 
exhaustively the allegations proffered by the merchant seamen working the SS Marine 
Perch, now the newest incident involving alleged malfeasance among members of the 
382ndMilitary Police Battalion.38 
 The US Army charged Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Smith of the Inspector 
General’s Department with the investigation of the allegations made by the merchant 
seamen of the SS Marine Perch and of the practices of the 382nd Military Police 
Battalion stationed in Bremerhaven.  The investigation produced both a final report and 
forty-six pages of testimony from port security officers, the chief of the military police, 
the local Provost Marshal General, and Counter Intelligence Corps special agents.  Their 
                                                 
38
 Johnson, “Letter replying…”; Col. A.B. Johnson, CMP, Deputy the Provost Marshal General, Letter 
replying to Senator James Huffman, Box 1175; Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, Letter responding to Senator 
Homer Capehart, 9/6/1946, Box 1175; Lucius Du Bignon Clay, Decision in Germany (New York: 
Doubleday & Co., 1950), 59-60; Ziemke, 317.   
  
34
testimony provides an idea of the extent of the black market and suggests the 
difficulty—if not the futility—of attempting to control both participation of merchant 
seamen in, and proliferation of contraband items into, the black market. 
 Unequivocally, the engine driving the black market in Bremerhaven, as in the 
rest of occupied Germany, was the cigarette.  Company D of the 382nd MP Battalion had 
control of ships’ gangways, the adjacent docks, and control of the gates providing access 
to the city of Bremerhaven.  Company D functioned as a vice squad, operating summary 
courts and collecting fines and contraband for later disposition.  MPs checked merchant 
seamen on the gangways to prevent the carriage of articles from the ship Post Exchange 
into Bremerhaven.  Beyond the gangway, patrols of port security officers could search 
the seamen on the docks, and all personnel were subject to search at the main gate, 
which provided the only access to Bremerhaven.  In spite of these overlapping levels of 
search, merchant seamen still attempted to smuggle cigarettes and other contraband 
beyond the docks, and were often successful.39 
 Special agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps would board each ship once it 
had docked at Bremerhaven, and provide to the master of each ship copies of the 
obtaining regulations pertaining to merchant seamen while on the docks and in the city.  
Copies would be posted in ships’ mess halls and bulletin boards, and the CIC agents 
would then read these regulations over the public address system.   Pursers and 
Transportation Officers were furnished with these regulations as well.  Furthermore, the 
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CIC agents provided shore leave passes, on which the regulations were printed, to the 
merchant seamen.  Military personnel were subject to the same rules and regulations.40 
 One of the regulations operative in Bremerhaven that affected merchant seamen 
was AG250.2(P1), “Security Control.”  The Adjutant General’s Office promulgated this 
circular to prevent the introduction of contraband into Bremerhaven, which served to 
perpetuate the black market.  “Security Control” featured expansive prohibitions.  
Packages of any kind could not be carried ashore, nor could anyone possess any 
currency other than the Allied Reichsmark while on shore.  Food and clothing had to 
remain onboard.  Allied personnel, whether civilian or military, could neither bring mail 
for German civilians nor accept mail from them for carriage to other ports on the 
Continent, the United States, or Great Britain.  What was permitted ashore is particularly 
salient, as the prohibition attempted to confront the expanding shadow economy built 
around a currency of cigarettes.  “The following items only may be carried ashore.  Any 
amount over this allowance will be confiscated and the shore leave pass of the offender 
will be revoked.  2 packages of cigarettes, or 8 cigars, or 1 package of tobacco.  2 candy 
bars.  2 packages of gum.”  The MPs of Company D 382nd Military Police Battalion 
operated under the authority of “Security Control” when they seized contraband from the 
offending seamen of the Marine Perch, and took candy bars and cigarette packs from 
Gabriel Agos.  ”The harbor master also provided a pamphlet for each ship entering the 
Bremerhaven port, “Information for Ships Visiting Ports of the Bremen Enclave,” which 
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explained police functions that affected merchant seamen.  Control of the black market 
featured prominently in the section enumerating “Police Powers.” 
The sale, barter, or exchange of cigarettes, cigars, tobacco, candy, or any 
food, clothing or other items is prohibited.  IT IS A PARTICULARLY 
SERIOUS OFFENSE FOR CREW MEMBERS TO BE FOUND WITH 
SHIP’S STORES IN THEIR UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION 
ASHORE [capitals in original document]41 
The circular AG250.2(P1) and the pamphlet testified to the scope of the black market 
problem in Bremerhaven, and the lack of success authorities had in constraining black 
market activities and the flow of goods into this vibrant economy.  “Security Control” 
did little to restrain the cupidity of the merchant seamen, the principal operators in this 
market.42 
 The principal problem cigarettes presented to authorities in occupied Germany, 
and conversely, their value to those operating on the black market, was their fungibility.  
Cigarettes and cigarette packs were ubiquitous and widely available; packs came with 
the rations of Allied soldiers, could be purchased at Post Exchanges, sent by mail, or, as 
in Bremerhaven, taken from ship’s stores in port cities.  Cigarette packs are also portable 
and durable, and these qualities recommended themselves in their adoption as the 
obtaining currency on the black market.  The American soldier, and especially a member 
of the merchant marine, operated at the nexus of the black market.  He alone had ready 
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and reliable access to cheap cigarettes, and he put most packs into “circulation” in the 
black market.  Like currency, a pack or a cigarette might change hands several times 
before the end user smoked it; and the cigarette, unlike the Reichsmark, could ameliorate 
hunger pangs during the thin years of 1946 and 1947.43 
Generally, the Allied Reichsmark was worthless on the licit economy, and 
Germans reverted to bartering as a means of exchange.  Douglas Botting identifies three 
groups regulating this system—townspeople provided valuables to GIs in exchange for 
goods from the Post Exchange, and the townspeople would visit farmers in the 
hinterlands for produce and meat in exchange for valuables and the cigarettes, candy 
bars, and coffee procured by the GIs.  For a dollar, an American serviceman could buy a 
pack of Lucky Strikes, and exchange the pack for 800 Reichsmarks.  The American 
could repeat this process a number of times, and purchase valuables set at exorbitant 
prices in Reichsmarks in black market bazaars.  Germans set up “factories” for the 
construction of whole cigarettes from multiple butts that American and British soldiers 
had thrown away, with, on average, seven butts equivalent to a full cigarette.  These 
persons employed tens of workers, who, for five dollars a day, cobbled together 
secondhand cigarettes.  One cigarette could buy a meal.  Giles MacDonogh writes that a 
single American cigarette could also purchase a “suburban railway ticket,” and in 
November 1945, a cigarette was good for four ounces of bread.  An alternative barter 
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economy, regulated by the amount of available cigarettes, had established itself in 
postwar occupied Germany.44 
Only the introduction of the Deutsche Mark in June of 1948 wiped out the black 
market and the buying power of the cigarette.  Lucius Clay, who had been Deputy 
Military Governor of Germany in 1945 and 1946, and had replaced General Joseph 
McNarney as Military Governor in March of 1947, struggled vainly to delimit the reach 
of this sub rosa barter economy and to break the purchasing power of the cigarette.  In 
1946, the American Military Government in Germany reluctantly set up a barter market 
in Berlin, and cigarettes were given a high rate of exchange to draw civilians and 
soldiers away from the black market operations downtown.  Appraisers were available to 
establish a fair market price for items brought for barter.  The barter market, while 
primarily serving to abate the black illicit economy, also addressed a need of the 
American soldiers.  The Germans brought household items to market that GIs could not 
obtain at Post Exchanges—curtains, linens, beds, tables, nightstands, and rugs—that 
served to make long-term living quarters in occupied Germany a bit more habitable.  In 
assessing the value of the market, Clay acknowledged its necessity and its success in 
maintaining a modicum of morale among Americans and Germans and combating the 
insalubrious aspects of the black market.45 
In point of fact, the German [Government] operates barter markets of its 
own which have been very successful.  In an economy in which the 
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currency has no real value and in which every German knows it will have 
less value at some future date when re-evaluation of currency is agreed, 
barter becomes inevitable.  In my view, it will be impossible to enforce 
regulations prohibiting all barter unless some controlled outlet is 
provided….this office recognizes that the barter market has certain 
undesirable features.  However, taking all factors into consideration, it 
does provide a controlled medium of exchange between Americans and 
Germans which appears to be desired by both, which has contributed to 
morale and which has reduced much more undesirable methods of 
trading.46 
In April of 1947, Clay wrote of the role of the cigarette in perpetuating the black market.  
In order to impede the functioning of the black market, Clay favored prohibiting the 
importation of cigarettes through the Army Post Office while importing tobacco for the 
Germans toward the manufacture of their own cigarettes.  This would undercut the 
Americans sailors’ role as black market “bankers” by driving down the value of the 
cigarette through increased German access to them.  But here again, as with the Berlin 
barter market, he acknowledged the exigencies of the situation.  “This will not stop 
barter.  However, it is doubtful if any other item could become a currency standard.”  
Clay recognized that the mundane nature and “legality” of most black market 
transactions—bartering for butter, coffee, or a few dollars, rather than attempting to 
make a fortune from guns, gasoline, and paintings—affected American perceptions of 
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participation.  “It is difficult to convince our people that the barter of cigarettes is 
immoral, and Americans do not accept regulations which they do not deem immoral.  
Many people barter who would not engage in direct black market or smuggling.”  Clay 
ultimately admitted the likely futility of his proposed actions, writing “You almost 
would have to swamp Germany with cigarettes to eliminate the cigarette black 
market…”  It was in this environment, where the only functioning economy relied on 
illegal bartering, where a cigarette was worth more than a hundred units of official 
currency, where even the Military Governor of Germany bowed to the logic of the 
alternative market, that one can understand the situation in Bremerhaven.47 
 At Bremerhaven, during the time the SS Marine Perch was in port and during the 
subsequent Inspector General’s investigation, the value of a pack of cigarettes on the 
black market was between ten and fifteen US dollars.  The merchant seaman entering 
Bremerhaven had much to gain by participating in the black market.  Unlike American 
military personnel on the Continent, he, having visited American ports, had access to 
dollars and the American market, and he received his pay in dollars rather than the 
Allied Reichsmark or in the scrip issued by USFET.  The merchant seaman, purchasing 
multiple packs of cigarettes cheaply, could sell these packs in Bremerhaven for illicit 
dollars, or take payment in Reichsmarks and have them exchanged for dollars onboard 
his ship.  At ten to fifteen dollars a pack, he would net himself a pretty sum.  In 
Bremerhaven, as with Allied personnel in other places in Germany, the merchant seamen 
financed the black market, injecting liquidity into it in the form of cigarettes.  The record 
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of the Marine Perch investigation shows this temptation was too great for merchant 
seamen to resist.  Company D of the 382nd MP Battalion had to fight this alluring venal 
impulse with every ship mooring at the dock, and with every seaman entering the city.48 
 First Lieutenant Jose Nine, Jr., a Port Security Officer for the Bremerhaven 
docks, was charged with the control of a dock guard of German civilians and with 
insuring that the MPs on duty were performing their jobs.  He had watched the MPs 
conduct searches of personnel entering the city.  The man would be brought into a 6x10 
shack by the main gate that Company D had erected for conducting searches out of sight 
of German civilians.  Inside, he would be asked how many packs of cigarettes he had on 
his person, and the MPs would permit him to proceed through the gate “after verifying 
the merchant seaman’s statement.  They verified the statement by searching him.”  
Usually, merchant seamen had hidden packs in excess of the amount permitted.  “But 
some have tried to put cigarettes in their socks and underneath their hats.”  The military 
police would ask merchant seamen to declare the number of packs in their possession, 
receive an answer of “three” and conduct a search that would duly contradict the stated 
number.  Nine continued, “…they would find he had more cigarettes in his socks and 
underneath his hat, back in his shirt; and they would also tape a carton of cigarettes with 
adhesive tape around his leg and that case I handled myself personally.”49 
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 In his testimony, Nine estimated the value of a package of cigarettes at five or six 
hundred marks, equivalent to five or six dollars.  Because determining the local value of 
a pack of cigarettes was imperative for the investigation of the Marine Perch allegations, 
the value given in Lieutenant Colonel Smith’s report may instead be considered more 
accurate.  Even this discrepancy notwithstanding, trading multiple packs at five dollars 
per instead of ten to fifteen could still net a seaman a healthy profit.  Before the Bremen 
Enclave switched to scrip for payment instead of the Reichsmark, “…they could convert 
some of their money on the ship.  They would just get an even [exchange in] money for 
dollars.  While taking 2 or 3 packages of cigarettes ashore would give them 10 or 20 
dollars, which they would use during the time they were going to be in the Port.”  Nine’s 
phrasing is unclear, but context suggests that seamen could exchange German currency 
for an equivalent amount of dollars.  Nine also discussed bartering, namely, “…if it was 
an excessive amount of cigarettes it would probably be with the idea of bartering with 
the Germans or trading for some particular object, a camera they had seen the day before 
and the next day they would try and get the cigarettes out.”50 
 Lieutenant William Waterhouse commanded Company D of the 382nd Military 
Police Battalion; as such, he was responsible for overall dock security and the military 
police providing it.  Waterhouse also conducted the summary court responsible for 
trying those merchant seamen charged with infractions of the “Security Control” 
circular.  Waterhouse assessed the fines for Ho Yin, Cigaro Garcia, and Pasqualino 
D’Angelo for possession of excess cigarette packs.  Waterhouse identified Private Eddie 
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Lede as the man whose forty dollars had been seized, and acknowledged that Lede had 
been fined the same amount; Waterhouse begged leniency for his part, noting that the 
forty dollars was assessed not only for carrying American currency off his ship, but also 
for the three cigars, two packs of cigarettes, two candy bars, and single brassiere.  In the 
record, his leniency is striking.  No offender was fined more than the maximum 
allowable punishment of two-thirds his monthly pay, specifically, in only five of the two 
hundred cases tried did Waterhouse mete out the maximum fine.  Moreover, Waterhouse 
had the option to consign the offenders to a month of hard labor, and had yet to do so as 
of the end of October, 1946.  He defended the high fines with reference to the black 
market.  “We made the fines on the basis of the violations of the large value of black 
market of cigarettes that are brought in this area.”  He continued that each of the seamen 
pleaded guilty to the charges as presented.51 
 The cigarette, Waterhouse asserted, ensured a full docket for the court.  From 
July to October 1946, the summary court had tried 200 cases.  “It has all been tobacco or 
97 percent of the cases we have involve tobacco.”  One of his cases involved a man who 
had attempted to smuggle seventy-five cartons of cigarettes out of the gate.  At the end 
of October 1946, Waterhouse alone held forty cartons worth of cigarettes under lock and 
key.  He attributed the high case load to the value of the cigarette in the Bremerhaven 
black market.  “I handle the black market cases and the price has been here from 
$100.00 to $150.00 per carton.  As you go further inland the price will go up to $200.00, 
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and in Berlin it is $300.00 per carton.”52  Providing an account similar to Nine’s, 
Waterhouse detailed the legerdemain to which merchant seamen resorted to sneak excess 
cigarettes and other contraband past the MPs. 
My men have found cigarettes under their hats. They have found 
cigarettes tied to the crutch of their body with string or adhesive tape.  
They have found cigarettes around their waist.  We have found men 
coming out with coffee in money belts.  We have found them with 
cigarettes tied, 3 to a string and tied just before the calf of the leg.  They 
have found cigarettes in their stockings and in packages and parcels 
which they carry, sometimes in hand bags.53 
Waterhouse provided a frank assessment of Company D’s efforts to control the influx of 
contraband into Bremerhaven.  “This area was so rank on blackmarketing [sic] we have 
been having people come in from all areas of Germany to deal with the men.”54 
 Colonel Herschel Baker was Director of Operations for the port of Bremerhaven.  
Baker was of the opinion that both merchant seamen and ships’ officers engaged in the 
black market.  His evidence was hearsay, conversations among seamen that he had 
chanced to overhear.  These persons had made “open statements in different places of 
how they have obtained in this port certain instruments such as field glasses for so many 
cartons of cigarettes and ship’s stores.”  Baker stated that merchant seamen mounted an 
unremitting effort to smuggle cigarettes out of the port, which contravened USFET 
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regulations.  In April of 1946, Baker had returned from the United States to Germany, 
and had overheard a ship’s steward discussing his success in the black market at 
Bremerhaven.  “The stewart [sic] on the victory ship did not know I was on duty at the 
Seventeenth Major Port.  He talked freely of how many nice oil paintings he was getting 
out of Germany for coffee, cigarettes, and other things.”  When Baker questioned him, 
the steward replied that his dealings were perfectly legal.55 
 Colonel Donald Dutton had been Provost Marshal of Bremerhaven while the SS 
Marine Perch had been at the docks in late August 1946.  Dutton commissioned two 
inquiries into allegations of military police malfeasance similar to those levied by the 
crew of the Marine Perch; both investigations found no irregularities in the practices of 
the 382nd Police Battalion.  Dutton considered the allegations of the merchant seamen 
working the Marine Perch, specifically the anonymous letters sent to Senator Homer 
Capehart, “unfounded.”  Dutton noted that the MPs would “frequently” stop merchant 
seamen and that these seamen would very often have in their possession “an illegal 
amount of cigarettes which, undoubtedly, have been taken ashore for bartering purposes” 
on the Bremerhaven black market.  Both merchant seamen and soldiers had taken 
property from the ships at the docks for “sale and barter,” Dutton averred, and “it is the 
desire of the Port Commander that this purpose be stopped.”  Dutton recounted that “In 
my opinion the Military Police have not been subjected to unreasonable treatment 
inasmuch as most of them have attempted to take cigarettes and other items off for sale 
barter.”  “Military Police” appears to be a typo—most port personnel and military 
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officials interviewed resoundingly castigated the merchant seamen for their peculation, 
flouting of standing regulations, and participation in the black market.  Dutton 
acknowledged that he had received complaints from merchant seamen regarding unfair 
treatment at the hands of the dock MPs, but delivered a damning indictment of the 
merchant seamen whose allegations were the subject of the investigation for which he 
was providing testimony.  “However, the Marine Perch was notorious in this port as 
being a source of cigarettes and other property for illegal sale and barter.”56 
 It would be remiss not to note that cigarettes were not the only items of value in 
the Bremerhaven black market, or for that matter, in Germany.  Eisenhower’s Europe-
wide proclamation, circular AG 383 GEC-AGO, “Troop Participation in the Black 
Market,” published in the wake of TALLY-HO, and circular AG 250.2(P1) “Security 
Control,” promulgated by the Adjutant General of Bremerhaven, both included 
prohibitions relating to food.  Eisenhower’s USFET circular stated, “All military 
personnel are, therefore, advised that they are forbidden: b. to purchase rationed German 
goods or services.  This includes, among other things, food, meals in restaurants, 
clothing, footwear, textiles, soap, and fuel.”  AG 250.2(P1) ordered that seamen and 
officers “are forbidden to carry ashore any of the following items: a. Food stuffs of all 
types, particularly coffee and butter.”  Bremerhaven also featured an active trade in 
foodstuffs on its black market.  Colonel Herschel Baker considered pilfering from ship’s 
stores a pressing concern.  Baker had preferred charges on a man who had stolen from 
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his ship’s stores to sell on the black market.  He was of the opinion that many seamen 
had stolen from their own stores for sale and barter in Bremerhaven “and they have been 
caught with it, maybe a jeep full of various kinds of foods, bacon, butter, coffee, sugar, 
and various kinds of foods.”  First Lieutenant Waterhouse recounted that in discussions 
with the Master of the SS Marine Perch, he asked after a certain merchant seaman 
McCall “who was apprehended two days ago carrying out approximately 60 individual 
tea bags,” and had not shown for his trial.  The bags were presumably pilfered from the 
stores of the Marine Perch.  The Consulate General at Bremen also conducted its own 
(rather tardy) investigation of the allegations of military police malfeasance; Secretary of 
War Robert Patterson included a brief portion of the report in a letter to Secretary of 
State James Byrnes, dated January 18, 1947.  The report from the Consulate General 
related that after searching the Master of the SS Ernie Pyle, the Bremerhaven military 
police “confiscated, as black market materials, two apples and an orange.”  Coffee and 
candy bars could function as a currency substitute as well as the ubiquitous cigarette, and 
the merchant seamen at Bremerhaven acted accordingly.57 
 The record displays preponderant evidence of the enthusiastic participation of 
merchant seamen in the black market operating in Bremerhaven.  But it is facile to 
suggest that in the Bremerhaven episode, blame lay entirely with the members of the 
Merchant Marine.  As described above, the American soldier was an active participant in 
and facilitator of the shadow economy that obtained in his nation’s zone of occupation.  
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As such, the record of the investigation of the Bremerhaven allegations provides 
evidence of the participation of American soldiers in the Bremerhaven black market.  
The GI was hardly the silent hand of this illicit economy, and some testimony furnished 
to Lieutenant Colonel Smith inculpated American soldiers. 
 First Lieutenant William Waterhouse testified that he had ordered his men not to 
provide rides to seamen to the city of Bremen.  The merchant seamen were trying to 
smuggle contraband out of the main gate, and members of Company D “would help 
them to get the stuff out” when they were searched.  Colonel Herschel Baker related to 
Smith that US Army personnel on duty on transport ships would steal cigarettes and 
other articles from the ship’s stores.  Baker was “instrumental” in bringing charges 
against an unspecified number of these military offenders.  He referred to “One certain 
individual who is now under general court martial for taking U.S. supplies off the ship 
which is now in this port, that is true as he is a member of the crew here on one of our 
Army tugs.”  Colonel Dutton, the former Provost Marshal of Bremerhaven, was perhaps 
the most honest of any of the witnesses whom Smith questioned.  His response is 
reproduced in its entirety, and the juxtaposition of the forthright admission of 
wrongdoing against the subsequent justifications for the admitted offenses is striking. 
It is true that Military Police at times carry cigarettes ashore and it is our 
effort to stop this and that orders be issued in it that this practice would be 
stopped.  While M.P’s. have at times been guilty, there was no general 
abuse by the M.P’s.  Yes, individuals have been tried for it.  We have had 
to have guards tried for theft of whisky and for stealing cigarettes.  The 
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reason is that the buards [sic] have been youngsters, but in general they 
have done a very good job.  It is true some individuals were guilty and 
not the organization as a whole.58 
Colonel Edward Connor, a Commanding Officer at the port of Bremerhaven, admitted 
that enlisted men and soldiers had attempted to “carry articles out of the port.”  
According to Connor, a large number of merchant seamen and soldiers had been tried in 
summary court for the possession of contraband.  He noted that even a commissioned 
officer “is now awaiting trial.”  The investigation of the Inspector General’s Department 
provides evidence that the bustling Bremerhaven black market proved too much of a 
temptation even to those sworn to prevent its expansion.59 
 The merchant seaman financed the black market obtaining in Bremerhaven in 
postwar occupied Germany.  Without the merchant seaman’s reliable supply of 
cigarettes, what black market did exist in Bremen would be restricted to some form of a 
barter economy.  He had ready and consistent access to a cheap supply of cigarettes, 
which constituted the preferred fungible form of exchange in the illicit barter economy 
that replaced a regular licit economy backed by the worthless Allied Reichsmark.  Just as 
a banker would inject currency into a licit economy to increase liquidity, the merchant 
seaman could expand the “money” supply in the black market by placing more cigarettes 
and cigarette packs into circulation.  It was the merchant seaman who controlled access 
to the fungible exchange unit of choice in the Bremerhaven black market.  All other 
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operators on the Bremerhaven black market needed the merchant seaman to regulate and 
provide the money supply.  The records of the Inspector General’s investigation into the 
allegations of military police malfeasance at the port of Bremerhaven support this 
contention.  In the letter which the crew members of the SS Marine Perch drafted 
enumerating their grievances against the 382ndMilitary Police Battalion of Bremerhaven, 
the writers acknowledged that with regard to cigarettes “their exchange in Germany is 
too high.”  This constituted the rationale for their complaint that their excess cigarette 
packs had been confiscated.  This assertion implies both that the crew members were 
aware of the existence of a German black market and that the cigarette held a high value 
on this market.  The excess cigarette packs, then, were almost certainly intended for 
barter or sale on the black market.  Provost Marshal Colonel Dutton’s assertion that the 
SS Marine Perch was an infamous source of goods for illegal barter and sale provides 
further support for this contention.  The testimony of various port officials in 
Bremerhaven further establishes the members of the Merchant Marine as inveterate and 
avid black market operators within the city.  There is no reason why one seaman should 
need, much less be able to dispose of through his own exertions, seventy-five cartons of 
cigarettes, as First Lieutenant William Waterhouse presented in his testimony.  Tobacco-
related infractions—that is, possession of cigarette packs beyond the permitted 
amount—constituted ninety-seven percent of Waterhouse’s caseload, an indication of 
the value of the cigarette on the black market.  First Lieutenant Jose Nine, Jr. and 
Waterhouse provided descriptions of the many artifices by which merchant seamen 
attempted to sneak cigarettes past the MPs at the dock gates.  That so many men were 
  
51
consistently willing both to develop outlandish contrivances and risk admittedly high 
fines in the carriage of excess cigarette packs points to certain remuneration at a high 
value were these men able to get their cigarette packs past the guards. 
The merchant seamen visiting the Bremerhaven docks were in a superb position 
to exploit Bremerhaven’s black market.  The ability to purchase cigarettes cheaply and 
resell them in a market assigning them high value gave the merchant seamen an 
unrivalled degree of purchasing and bargaining power—they controlled the growth of 
the black market because they controlled access to the market’s currency.  As such, 
merchant seamen were the black market in Bremen.  Participation promised to be 
handsomely remunerative.  It is incorrect to assert that the Bremerhaven black market 
grew from 1945 into 1946; rather, it exploded.  If perhaps he did not interpret the results 
of TALLY-HO correctly, the development of the Bremerhaven black market in the year 
after the end of fighting in Europe absolutely contradicted Edwin Sibert’s belief that 
there was no extensive, large-scale black market in postwar occupied Germany.  The 
reason this black market grew so aggressively was the lure of profit; black market trade 
in cigarettes offered the merchant seamen the opportunity of a cheaply earned, reliable 
income. Merchant seamen supplied the cigarettes undergirding the growth of the illicit 
economy because they stood to make money.  Ultimately, the activities of the merchant 
seamen at Bremerhaven demonstrate the use of the black market as a form of illicit 
supply to indigenous inhabitants, and that this form of supply was predicated upon the 
ability of the merchant seaman (or, by extension, any American soldier or civilian) to 
make a profit.   
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The Bremerhaven episode also illuminates a counterpoint to the historiographical 
contention of a German victimhood at least partly predicated upon the postwar black 
market.  Despite the vociferous professions of victimhood from the German populace, 
emphasized by Zierenberg, Grossman, and Hilton, at least in the American zone, the 
victimizers were unwitting and the victimization was perhaps inevitable.  The American 
soldier wanted Allied Reichsmarks, sex, and valuables on the cheap, and if a German 
chose to engage in a trade with him, all the better; the American was looking for extra 
cash rather than a forum in which to dominate the occupied population.  Echoing Steege, 
Germans made an affirmative decision—perhaps compelled by circumstance—to 
survive on the black market; in the absence of a viable licit economy, a German also 
chose to subject him or herself to the black market’s high prices in exchange for access 
to food or the means to purchase it.  The Americans—in this case, merchant seamen 
disembarked at Bremerhaven—were simply accidental financers motivated by a chance 
at easy profit.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
53
CHAPTER III 
 
AMERICAN SUPPLIERS: MISAPPROPRIATION 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that the black market functioned as a method of 
illicit supply because Americans who engaged in such activity stood to make handsome 
profits.  The merchant seamen operating at Bremerhaven found black market activity to 
be sufficiently remunerative to justify engaging in such transactions.  In fact, seamen 
considered the black market so profitable a venture that they were willing to trade 
despite the risk of confiscation of goods already purchased, and steep fines against their 
pay.  The potential profits far higher than the fines ensured that Lieutenant Waterhouse 
would have a full docket, mostly of tobacco related cases, as long as merchant seamen 
were in port.  As long as the local population desired cigarettes, demand would be 
constant and prices would remain high.  If an American wanted to make some extra 
money, he need only look to his cigarette ration or his purchases from the Post 
Exchange.  Profit provided sufficient motivation for Americans to transfer rationed and 
controlled items—contraband goods—to local populations. 
 Profit, however, did not constitute the only motivation for illicit supply to the 
indigenous population, and the black market was not the only medium for it.  
Misappropriation of government property—its diversion for private use or to an 
unauthorized channel—was a common type of delinquency in the United States Army 
during the occupation.  Clifton Bryant defines misappropriation as “the unauthorized 
distribution and reallocation of equipment and supplies.”  The most commonly used 
terms varied based on who was writing the criminal investigation report or drawing up 
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charge sheets for court-martial: “misappropriation,” “illegal possession,” and “larceny” 
were all used to indicate that one party had seized and carried away the property of 
another without permission, with “larceny” suggesting that the stolen goods were 
specifically intended for the use of the alleged thief.  The materiel was sometimes 
destined for the black market, and at other times it was appropriated for the personal use 
of the accused.  Despite the above enumeration of terms, it is important to note that 
misappropriation only bears a superficial resemblance to theft.  Bryant makes this 
distinction, “The individual who commits theft of military property for profit generally 
has criminal intent and willfully undertakes to defraud the military for personal 
economic gain,” whereas an “individual in the military simply views the equipment that 
he misappropriates as surplus or something that would not be needed or missed, that he 
is putting to more productive use—his!”60       
The merchant seamen of Bremen, constrained by a transient lifestyle, the need 
for easily transported merchandise, and scrutiny from the military police, found black 
market trading in cigarettes apt to their circumstances.  The chief difference between 
merchant seamen and most other Americans in Europe was the former group’s 
consistently itinerant lifestyle.  Most other Americans had to stay put in Europe.  As 
such, these Americans were able to form relationships with the local population.  More 
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often than not, this meant forming relationships with women.  Circulars prohibiting 
fraternization were openly flouted.  German women, confronted by the stark contrast of 
the victorious American in his starched uniform, and the purchasing power he 
commanded, and the defeated, penniless German in ragged clothes, chose the former.  
Americans also had access to food, which the Germans desperately needed and sorely 
lacked.  As Petra Goedde has demonstrated, gender dynamics played a central role in 
determining who received access to American food.  Women were often providers for 
their families while dependent upon an American for the food requisite to make up the 
difference between the ration card allotment and a level of calories fit for survival.61     
This chapter is an examination of a second type of illicit American supply: the 
provision of rationed and controlled goods to Germans and Austrians outside of black 
market transactions.  Usually, this exchange occurred when American soldiers formed 
relationships with local women.  As such, this chapter is best understood in the context 
of the food scarcity in Germany and the failed nonfraternization policies of the American 
Army.  Food was the most valuable commodity a German, Austrian, or displaced person 
might possess.  Accordingly, the black market charged the highest prices for it, and some 
black marketers were willing to risk capture and death breaking into the American 
depots and trains that contained it.  American soldiers had reliable and cheap access to 
food as members of the occupying force.  They desired the company of women, which in 
turn gave women in the occupied territories the best position to exploit the American 
bounty.  Grossman writes that “…girls quickly learned that a relationship with an 
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occupier was the best way to support their mothers.”  Women understood their sexual 
value and leveraged this worth to gain access to the material bounty the GI offered.  
Goedde’s study utilizes gender as an analytical tool in explaining the American 
occupation.  She argues that the chief difference between Americans and Germans was 
one of power, which was constructed in terms of gender roles, as German men were both 
defeated and often not present in postwar Germany.  As such, American men became the 
providers and protectors of German women and role models to German boys; this was a 
normative gender role, and Goedde demonstrates that women accepted this state of 
affairs.  Without access to a male breadwinner, and unable to provide for themselves, 
German women sought American companionship to fill the economic void and the 
cupboard.  “In the context of American-German relationships, the dependent-provider 
relationship became gendered as American men provided for their German girlfriends.”  
In this way, gender dynamics constituted an integral component of the illicit supply 
discussed herein.  German women had the easiest access to American food.62 
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If the cigarette held an intrinsic value on the postwar black market, what 
Germans, Austrians, and displaced persons prized most was food.  An OMGUS survey 
of schoolboys in the summer of 1946 revealed that, “The principal concern was 
obtaining food.”  Thirty percent of the 250 respondents indicated that Germany needed 
more food aid, and “26 per cent reported that their greatest wish was for more food.”  
From war’s end until currency reform on June 20, 1948, according to the OMGUS 
opinion polls, the greatest concern of the German population in the American Zone was 
food, except for the first two postwar winters, “when clothing concerns took 
precedence.”  In August of 1946, Morrison Strayer, head surgeon of the armed forces in 
the European Theater, noted that sixty percent of the population in the American Zone 
subsisted on diets certain to lead to deficiency diseases.  In 1945, OMGUS allotted 1,150 
calories “which varied downward,” per person in Germany; officials assumed that 
Germans managed to find four hundred to five hundred calories on the black market, 
providing a maximum of 1,500 calories, “not enough to sustain productive labor.”  
                                                                                                                                                
control Germans while refusing to adequately feed them, Germans circumvented the controls of the state 
and the provisions of the licit economy to secure their survival amidst universal want.  Decisions to forage, 
barter, exist on rations, or trade on the black market all constituted affirmative decisions to take control of 
one’s destiny in spite of a status as defeated or occupied.  Scarcity provided Germans with agency. 
Grossman (2007) argues that scarcity provided a notional locus for the contestation of competing claims of 
victimhood between displaced persons—especially Jews—and Germans.  Germans were frustrated that 
Jews had access to American goods as a result of their DP status, which also allowed them more 
opportunities to sell on the black market, whereas Jews were angered that Germans had the ability to 
access American goods through common bonds and traditions (especially Christmas) and fraternization 
with American officers (Jewish-American soldiers constituted an exception to this grievance).  Hilton 
(2010) explores how Germans considered the postwar black market a symbol of their victimhood, and how 
its existence served as a signal of societal deterioration, exposing, among other things, the breakdown of 
the official economy.  Despite their disgust for “big operators” and displaced persons, Hilton argues, 
scarcity forced Germans onto the black market in droves.  Germans rationalized their behavior on the 
market vis-à-vis the foreigners in their midst—foreigners were unscrupulous and profit-hungry, Germans 
were honest and driven by the need for sustenance.  This chapter suggests that while women used their 
status as victims, as those needing protection, they still relied upon the willingness of American soldiers to 
provide American rations and PX luxuries.                
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Projections indicated that agricultural output in Germany for the year ending September, 
1946, would yield only 938 calories per person.  Insufficient nutrition would persist for 
years.  For the week of May 8, 1947, in Wuppertal, Germany, the town council issued 
only 650 calories of food per day, and in Essen, “three slices of corn bread and a tiny 
heap of sugar” were given out to adults as a daily ration.63 
 German responses to the survey question “How are you making out with food?” 
were overwhelmingly negative for the months May to November of 1946.  Forty-five to 
fifty six percent of respondents in each survey answered “Not Well, Badly.”  The 
American sector in Berlin, whose inhabitants were unable to trade with farmers outside 
of the city, faced a much bleaker food shortage; approximately eighty percent of 
Berliners answered, “Not Well, Badly.”  A subsequent survey in June, 1947, reflected a 
twenty percent increase in persons unable to find sufficient food in the American Zone, 
and no change in the affected population in Berlin.  Records of caloric intake for the 
American sector in Berlin in the first half of 1947 substantiated these survey responses, 
but probably indicated a slight improvement in circumstances.  Taken as a whole, the 
population therein received seven hundred to one thousand calories less than what 
OMGUS health officials recommended for each age group.  Laborers in heavy industry 
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saw an even greater disparity in actual caloric intake.  In such circumstances, Germans 
resorted to heroic measures to search out food, and survive.64 
 Steege asserts that “…almost all relationships in Berlin—professional and 
personal—operated in a network of material negotiations.”  This statement can be 
applied to all of Germany.  These “material negotiations,” the various exertions 
necessary for survival—trading cash for an illicit good or service, illegal bartering, 
requiring perquisites to carry out a service or provide a good—provided many Germans 
and displaced persons the means to circumvent a licit economy that could provide 
neither coal, nor clothing, nor medicine, nor household necessaries.  Most of all, the 
official economy and the various ration systems it supported could not provide adequate 
food.  Native inhabitants entered the black market to supplement their meager or 
nonexistent rations, acquire foodstuffs not available through official channels, or simply 
to stay alive.  Many Germans went to the countryside to barter with farmers, exchanging 
jewelry, shoes, and furniture for food.  Farmers were required to register the amount of 
their produce and livestock with government officials, but compliance was low and 
enforcement difficult.  Townspeople accused the farmers of hoarding goods, diverting 
some to the black market, and keeping the remainder for their own use.  Many city 
dwellers did not earn salaries enabling them to purchase goods on the black market, 
exacerbating individual instances of want.65   
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Ziemke asserts that farmers were the most “numerous” and “successful” of black 
marketeers.  Among other instances, “In Bavaria in the fall of 1945, the legal butchering 
of hogs was 50 percent below normal, and six sugar beet processing plants had to be 
closed down because the farmers had diverted the beets to the black market.”  A verb 
reflecting how Germans regarded the farmers, “hamstern,” began circulating in the 
language.  The Roman Catholic Cardinal Frings stated that in such conditions of want 
and penury, small scale theft could not be sinful.  Walter Ulbricht, of the East German 
Socialist Unity Party, was at pains to excuse the black market exertions of those 
Germans attempting to survive this ubiquitous scarcity. As noted in the previous chapter, 
American officials, yielding to the size and allure of the black market, and 
acknowledging that the ration system was severely flawed, opened a barter market in 
Berlin in August 1946.  Berliners could acquire a certificate with the value of the good to 
be sold, using this certificate to trade for other appraised goods at the market.  It did little 
to dent the enthusiasm of profiteers and the perseverance of those bartering and selling 
to survive.66   
Within this mélange of negotiations that Germans pursued toward securing their 
survival—black marketeering, theft, hoarding, and legally questionable barter—women 
used their companionship and their bodies in negotiating with American men to escape 
the material hardship in which they existed.  German women relied upon their 
relationships with GIs to shield them from want and starvation; Americans, moved by 
affection, pity, and lust, provided their US government rations in exchange for intimacy.  
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A gift of a candy bar or a can of spam to a German girlfriend did not constitute a black 
market transaction.  However, in transferring ownership of government property to their 
girlfriends, mistresses, and fiancées—property either of OMGUS, the American Army, 
or the British Army—enlisted men and officers diverted these controlled goods from 
official channels.  This caused both food loss in government stocks and drove up prices 
for goods on the legitimate market as Allied supplies were sold in the shadow economy.  
Laura Hilton remarks that, stripped of artificial government price control, goods and 
services showed their true value on the black market, “filling the gap between official 
supply and voracious demand.”  Compelled by the imperative of survival, the price for 
food was whatever buyers could pay.67 
American bounty supported the black market in the American Zone, but this was 
especially true for food.  Ziemke writes, “On the black market, of course, after the 
Americans came everything could be had: butter, Spam, cheese, canned meats, and 
liquor.  The prices in marks ran into the thousands for small quantities.”  American 
trains, moving through the interior of the zone and transporting food and PX goods both 
to cities and their American installations, were constant targets of Germans and 
displaced persons.  The trains were sources of materiel and foodstuffs, which could be 
redirected to the black market or appropriated to one’s own use.  Food was the most 
coveted controlled good.  An intelligence bulletin from the Railway Security Division of 
the Provost Marshal declared, “Items most frequently pilfered: Food—729, PX—244, 
Clothing—61.”  Even though these numbers do not have a qualifying unit (context 
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suggests that “instances” might be appropriate), they demonstrate the value of food in a 
hierarchy of need.  The writer affirms this judgment later in the bulletin, writing 
“Pilferers apparently have little interest in items other than food or clothing.”68   
German railway police, Polish guards, desperate German civilians, and displaced 
persons, both singly and in groups, stole from the train cars, in actions which American 
sources universally refer to as “pilferage.”  The trains and their contents represented the 
abundance that the Americans brought to the occupied countries, and highlighted the 
want in which a German or a stateless person lived.  The Germans, too, saw this 
American largess as the engine powering the black market—whatever was in the trains 
was potential fodder for market transactions.  While black market operators sought to 
appropriate the goods to enrich themselves, those utilizing only subsistence bartering 
and selling considered the American bounty the cause of their suffering.  Prices were too 
high on the black market for honest Germans, living from wages alone, to participate.69   
A selection of intelligence reports from 1946-1947, demonstrates the sheer 
abundance of food the Americans brought into Germany, and the scope of the pilferage 
problem and attendant diversion of supplies to the black market.  Diverting food to the 
black market was so lucrative because starving Germans and displaced persons had to 
get their calories from somewhere, and those subsisting on Card III and Card V rations, 
“normal consumers” and “others” respectively, were guaranteed substantially less than 
2,000 calories daily.    
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On 29 Mar 46 three Germans were arrested in Bremerhaven in possession 
of nineteen pounds of butter, six one gallon cans of lard and other lesser 
items, and stated when interrogated that many Germans were stealing and 
hiding supplies for their own consumption.  The above mentioned 
Germans have been sought for three months in Bremen in connection 
with black market activities.70 
On 16 April 1946 two (2) Security guards were patrolling the Rangier 
Yards in Nurnberg Germany, when they noticed two German Civilian 
Railway workers with US supplies.  Upon investigation they found 
approximately 20 lbs. of meat and three fourths bucket of eggs in their 
possession.  The two Germans were apprehended.  Final disposition, both 
were imprisoned and fined.71 
On 4 May 1946 at 0850 the German Civil Police at Letter, Germany 
called the security detachment there regarding some American goods 
which were pilfered from trains.  Seven (7) persons were apprehended 
and turned over to the German Civil Police at Hanover.  The following 
items were recovered: 8-5 gallon cans dehydrated carrots, 50-1 gallon 
cans powdered milk, 24 cans pease [sic] 50 lbs. flour, 84 Pr. CI shoes.72 
About the middle of July a German Railway policeman was approached 
by two men while he was on duty in the Main Station in Munich.  These 
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men offered to go with the German Railway Policeman to various houses 
where Black Market activities were being carried on.  The German 
Railway Policeman was to search the houses and confiscate the goods, 
which were then to be divided evenly amongst the three.  The German 
Railway Policeman pretended to agree with them and arranged to meet 
them the next day.  The men failed to appear at the agreed place.  On 1 
August 1946, these men again approached the German Railway 
Policeman and informed him that at a certain address he would find 
twenty cartons of cigarettes, twelve packages of sugar, eighteen packages 
of coffee, twelve cartons of chocolate, one case of cocoa and 37.000 
marks.73   
While the local populations could control the terms of exchange on the trains, through 
stealing, the arrival of the contents at the mess hall returned control to the Americans.  
Food was so valuable as a black market commodity that operators risked apprehension 
by railway police, the exchange of gunfire, and death, to seize it from train cars.  It was 
so valuable a commodity because Germans could not survive on ration cards; the licit 
economy could not furnish Germans with the calories they needed.  Atina Grossman 
notes that housewives, considered “unproductive workers” and receiving the lowest 
ration card, resorted to foraging in the countryside and whatever they could trade for 
food on the black market as “quite simply the only viable economy available.”74 
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What they could trade for food and coal, in many and perhaps most cases, was 
themselves.  A prostitute taken before a magistrate on charges of moral turpitude stated, 
“Yes, this is how I live.  And I am…happy because my friends provide me food and 
clothes to wear.”  Later on, she related that “On Sundays, I had to go foraging for 
potatoes, or to get wood from the forest….Now I finally want to live for a change.”  
Prostitution provided this young woman with not only necessary calories, but luxuries 
like chocolate, coffee, and clothing.  By 1946, at least a half million women were selling 
sexual favors to survive.  A British private remembered, “I felt a bit sick at times about 
the power I had over that girl.  If I gave her a three-penny bar of chocolate she nearly 
went crazy.”  Second Lieutenant Christopher Leefe, also in the British Army, wrote that 
“…as well as food we used to take briquettes of coal to our girl friends in Agustaplatz.  
And in return for those gifts, courtesy of the British Army—which kept them alive, 
really—they would let us sleep with them.”  Such use of official army stores constituted 
illicit activity because they were either rationed or controlled goods, to which Germans 
were not entitled access.75 
German women were the best positioned relative to other Germans and displaced 
persons to exploit the American largess, locked in trains and distributed to the messes 
and Post Exchanges.  Nonfraternization policy had quickly become a dead letter.  Sixth 
and Ninth Army intelligence bulletins from the spring of 1945 reported a “surprisingly 
large” number of women accompanying American soldiers in public spaces.  On the 
ground, the American Army had accepted the reality and begun establishing 
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prophylactic stations and mandating reports of “the contraction of venereal disease.”  
Solutions for enforcing nonfraternization were ludicrous.  These included forcing female 
DPs to wear an armband to differentiate them from German women, and posting 
billboards every fifty yards along roads admonishing that troops “Don’t Fraternize.”  A 
Judge Advocate for SHAEF noted pointedly “Soldiers will fraternize in the manner 
indicated, in spite of any rules to the contrary, and should they, fearful of being tried by 
court martial for such fraternization, avoid the use of prophylaxis or checkup, venereal 
disease may become rampant and completely out of control.”  The New York Times 
reported in June 1945 that “a CIC detachment was reportedly sent to watch a security 
guard detachment that had been detailed to shadow an MP private who was suspected of 
flirting with a German girl.”  Compounding difficulties with enforcement, the French 
and Russians placed no such restrictions upon their soldiers.  Policymakers in the Army 
could not have tried better to create a situation wherein soldiers considered themselves 
specific targets of an unfair standard whose purpose was “to give the brass the first crack 
at all the good looking women.”76 
   Americans gave up their government-issue food for sexual intercourse, for a 
date or companionship, and if it developed in the course of things, affection and love.  
But the food that the soldiers provided was the property of the United States, and as 
such, was a controlled good meant only for their own consumption, and not permitted 
for transfer to native inhabitants.  Army regulations notwithstanding, soldiers continued 
to trade their own rations, chocolate and coffee purchased from the PX, hot meals from 
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the mess, and meat and produce from kitchen stocks.  An act of misappropriation was 
contingent upon intent.  An American working at, or having some form of legitimate 
access to, a mess could purchase food for himself.  However, if an American used his 
mess access to take food or a meal without paying for it, or having purchased it, to 
provide it to a member of the occupied population, he was guilty of misappropriation.77 
Two investigations shed light on misappropriation of government foodstuffs as a 
type of illicit supply in occupied Germany.  The first is the October 1946 court martial of 
an American mess supervisor, Technical Sergeant William Cataldo.  Cataldo was the 
subject of an investigation by the 822nd Military Police Company, stationed in Berlin.  
This investigation revealed that Cataldo, in the course of his duties as mess supervisor, 
had removed rations from the mess pantry without authorization.  Cataldo had provided 
food to a German woman in October 1946, and in August, had used misappropriated 
rations from the mess to secure an apartment for another girlfriend.  He was referred to 
the Trial Judge Advocate for special court martial upon the former charges, but the 
August incident was included as evidence at his trial.  The second investigation is the 
subject of an inspector general’s report from April 1948.  In July 1947, Francis J. 
Belluscio, a civilian employed by the Department of the Army with United States 
Forces, Austria (USFA), was assigned to the Allied Secretariat at the Allied Commission 
Building in Vienna in a supervisory capacity.  Belluscio took advantage of his position 
to divert hot meals and coal from the mess for his fiancée.  The Cataldo and Belluscio 
cases demonstrate both that misappropriation constituted a form of illicit supply to the 
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indigenous populations of Germany and Austria, and that this form of illicit supply 
relied upon the existence of a relationship—usually an intimate one—between an 
American and a local.  The cases also reflect the context of scarcity in which these 
relationships occurred, as the men supplied, and the women accepted, food from 
American government sources.  Food was a valuable commodity among civilians, and, 
with respect to Cataldo and Belluscio, a relationship with an American provided them 
indirect access to the premier source of American rations: the American mess.78 
William Cataldo was inducted into the Army in October 1944 in Pennsylvania.  
After VE Day, he was stationed in Berlin with occupation forces.  Prior to his Army 
service, he had been a cook, and the Army put this skill to use.  Cataldo was detailed to 
the Mess Section, and assigned to the Ihnestrasse Civilian Mess as the mess supervisor 
in June of 1946.  As a mess supervisor, Cataldo, beyond his duties as head cook, had at 
his disposal a staff of Germans.  The Germans were responsible for providing service at 
the mess hall: working the stockroom, washing dishes, and transporting food to and from 
the mess as Cataldo dictated.  Cataldo performed inventories of the mess pantry and 
determined how much food was needed per meal period, which food his staff would 
cook for Americans drawing their rations from the Ihnestrasse kitchen.  Cataldo’s 
supervisor was the Mess Officer, Captain A.G. Meyer of Berlin Command, Mess 
Section.79 
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Cataldo distinguished himself as an efficient and hard worker.  In his efficiency 
ratings Cataldo maintained a rank of “Excellent,” and in the summer of 1946, Meyer saw 
fit to recommend him for a promotion from Private First Class to Corporal; Cataldo’s 
commanding officer promoted him to the rank of Technical Sergeant and he received a 
simultaneous promotion to Mess Sergeant.  Meyer remarked that “He performed his 
duties very well.  Was always punctual and cloud be depended on.  If I told him to do 
something, before I could check, it would be done.”80 
Captain Meyer alone could authorize the removal of food from the mess.  Mess 
drivers would take this food to nearby mess halls or the local motor pool.  Meyer 
instructed his staff that they could not remove items from the stockroom without his 
permission, and that taking food from the mess to German homes was prohibited.  
German consumption of mess food stocks was circumscribed.  The court transcript 
reads, “It is my understanding that if a person has domestic help in the house, they can 
get the rations.”  Meyer replied, “Not from the mess hall.  German civilians cannot take 
it to their homes.  They have to take it to where they work and keep it there.”  Meyer 
affirmed under questioning that he had never made an exception to the food prohibition 
for German homes, and that Cataldo had received these instructions.  In his absence, 
Meyer would authorize the Mess Sergeant to act on his behalf.  In effect, this permitted 
the Mess Sergeant to order the removal of food from the stockroom without the 
authorization of the Mess Officer.  Were he so inclined, the acting Mess Officer could 
use his position to expropriate rations, unimpeded by his superior.  On October 11, 1946, 
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Meyer was away from Ihnestrasse on business, and William Cataldo was the acting 
Mess Officer; Cataldo called the 822nd MP Battalion to report the theft of a case of 
peaches.  The subsequent investigation would implicate Cataldo in multiple acts of 
misappropriation.  The record indicates that in three instances, Cataldo engaged in 
misappropriation of food from the mess pantry.  In each instance, this misappropriation 
occurred as a direct result of his interest in a woman.81 
Cataldo’s troubles began when he met a German woman, Martha Donner, during 
the summer of 1946.  Cataldo was apparently so taken with her that he felt compelled to 
provide her with an apartment, or at least acquire a place where they both could go when 
they wanted to spend evenings together.  To this end, Cataldo asked Gerd Knast, a 
German who had been working “as kitchen help” that summer, whether he knew of an 
apartment he could rent “for two or three months for his girl.”  Knast contacted a friend 
whose fiancée did his laundry, Kurt Braack.  Braack had gone blind and fortuitously for 
Knast and Cataldo, was bedridden in the hospital, leaving his apartment vacant.  Knast 
related 
After a conversation with Braack, I told Cataldo I had a room for him, he 
found it satisfactory.  He agreed to give to Braack rations to pay for the 
use of the room.  The price was not set between me and Braack, but was 
decided between Cataldo and Braack.  I, however, knew that Braack 
could only rent out the room until he returned from the hospital.  
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However, I do know positively that Cataldo did not give Braack cash, but 
did give food stuffs.  As far as I know Braack received goods twice.82        
In his oral testimony, Braack acknowledged that he rented the room to Cataldo, but 
specified that this occurred in September.  Cataldo explicitly requested a room for the 
summer, and a friend, Sergeant Sanford Prince of the Mess Motor Pool, recounted that 
he dined with Cataldo at Braack’s apartment in August.  Cataldo and Knast corroborate 
this assertion; as such, it seems certain that Cataldo had use of the apartment for at least 
August and September.  There is no evidence to ascertain whether Donner used the 
apartment furnished to her.  As payment for the room, Cataldo gave Braack a ration 
issue of corned beef, roast beef, loaves of white bread, and some coffee.  Cataldo later 
delivered another box containing a loaf of bread and some sugar.  Braack and his fiancée 
ate the food, but given Cataldo’s known connection with Ihnestrasse Mess, Braack must 
have been dissimulating when he affirmed that “they accepted these things without any 
thought as to where they came from.”  Braack would not have accepted the food in 
payment if it were without value, and the only reason the food had value was that 
Germans like Braack could not get such food licitly.  The food which Cataldo offered 
Braack originated from the Ihnestrasse Mess storeroom, and was the property of the 
American government.  Therefore, its removal constituted an act of misappropriation.83 
 The two issues of mess rations which Cataldo supplied Braack in exchange for 
the room constitute the first instance of misappropriation in this case.  Cataldo had 
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received orders from Captain Meyer forbidding the transfer of food from the stockroom 
to the homes of German civilians; Germans could only consume American food both if 
they were employed by the Americans and were at their place of work.  This allowed 
Americans to control the conditions under which Germans had access to this rationed 
good.  Furthermore, the circular “Troop Participation in Black Market Trade” expressly 
forbade the exchange of any rationed items “to Germans and civilians in the U.S. zone of 
occupation.”  The Adjutant General’s office interdicted the trade or selling of items 
purchased at the Post Exchange, and the AG also divided allowances into classes.  
Americans, civilian and military, were part of Scale A.  Implied was the idea that the 
ration and PX allowances of one class did not transfer to another.  Access to food at the 
Ihnestrasse Mess could only be secured by presenting appropriate credentials indicating 
the user was entitled to American military rations.  Army Circular 56 mandated that 
“Sales to personnel listed under Scale “A” will be made by unit exchanges only on 
presentation of an official Army Exchange ration Card—European Theater.”  There was 
no way for a German to acquire legitimate access to American foodstuffs outside his 
place of work.  Cataldo could not provide mess rations to Braack without violating this 
interdict, which he had done by transferring American property outside of official 
channels for use by an unauthorized person.84 
 Taking inventory in the mess stockroom provided Cataldo numerous 
opportunities to illegally appropriate food, and his peculation did not stop after the 
exchange with Braack.  During August, Cataldo and Donner used the apartment to host 
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Sergeant Prince and his girlfriend, Ursula.  On that evening, Cataldo recounted “We ate 
food that I had brought form the Ihnestr. mess and that Sgt. Prince had brought.”  Prince, 
however, had received permission from the manager of the Motor Pool Civilian Mess to 
take rations to his billet every Sunday.  The food that Prince provided was part of that 
allotment.  Cataldo’s statement does not specify whether he received permission to 
remove the rations he provided for dinner, but considering his previous filching, a line in 
the statement suggests that the removal was unauthorized:  “I have taken no food from 
the mess since.”85 
 Cataldo’s final recorded instance of illegal appropriation occurred on October 11, 
1946.  The court martial was convened to try this instance of theft.  Once again, a love 
interest impelled Cataldo’s unauthorized removal of rations from the stockroom.  
Cataldo apparently was fickle in love, considering the alacrity with which he shifted 
allegiance from Donner to his new interest.  Ilse Muenzberg found work with the 
Americans as a kitchen hand in early August.  She recounted that “On 25 September 
1946, I met this one for the first time.  We frequented an American club and met one 
another often in the club on the Botanical Gardens, too.”  They took each other’s 
company for about a month; heretofore, Cataldo had not provided her with any 
contraband from the mess.  Eventually, intent upon providing a pledge of his affection to 
Ilse, Cataldo once more pilfered from the stores at Ihnestrasse Mess.86  
 On October 11, 1946, Cataldo performed his afternoon duties in the stockroom.  
He requested the assistance of a kitchen hand, Fritz Weber, in removing mess rations for 
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his personal use.  Colloquially, this action is referred to as “giving down,” the laying 
aside of rations for purposes other than distribution to authorized consumers at the mess 
hall.  Weber remarked, “I had to give ‘down’ several cases which were for the ration of a 
Fraulein.”  The mess driver, Hans Wuestenhagen, took Cataldo to Muenzberg’s address 
at 47 Lichtenrader Strasse.  Wuestenhagen recalled that Cataldo had in his possession a 
package and a box that were standard cartons for the transport of rations, and that 
Cataldo did not return with the cartons when he reappeared outside Muenzberg’s 
apartment.  Muenzberg testified 
On Friday, however, he brought a carton containing some food in cans to 
my home.  I did not count the cans.  Cataldo brought some flour in a 
paper-sack to me, too.  A small bag which also was in the carton 
contained some sugar.  Cataldo only put the items at my home and left the 
house.  I still accompanied him downstairs.  Here I saw that the Mess-
driver Wuestenhagen had driven him to Berlin-Neukoelln.  Cataldo said 
to me that the food was definitely for me.87     
Cataldo implicated himself in his testimony, confessing that “I took flour, sugar, 
peaches, fruit juice, peas, meat, pepper, tea, tomatoes and bouillon cubes.”  The court 
found Cataldo guilty on a charge of misappropriation, specifying that Cataldo did 
“Knowingly and willfully misappropriate certain food stuffs….of a value of three dollars 
and twelve cents ($3.12), property of the United states, furnished and intended for the 
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Military Service thereof.”  He was sentenced to one month of hard labor and a thirty 
percent reduction in pay for a “like period.”88 
 William Cataldo engaged in three known instances of peculation of mess stores, 
which actions constituted misappropriation of government property.  Cataldo diverted 
this food to German civilians, despite contemporaneous theater directives prohibiting the 
transfer of American materiel to Germans, making such supply of American goods 
illicit.  The existence of a reciprocal relationship is central to an understanding of this 
kind of transaction.  Donner and Muenzberg were young women, and for Cataldo, the 
proffered food served not only as a token of affection, but as an invitation for more 
meetings, for sexual relations.  Cataldo arranged for a second apartment, which he 
provided Donner, indeed, one that he visited only a few times.  Muenzberg relates that 
after two weeks of courtship, Cataldo visited her address unannounced, offering a 
package of rations for her private use.  Quite simply, young women existed at the top of 
a hierarchy of access to American goods, and reaped the benefits.  With an American 
boyfriend came the promise of food beyond the ration card, and the comforts of 
chocolate and cigarettes.  This connection to an occupier shielded the woman from the 
need and penury that existed around her.  Food scarcity drove even mothers and war 
widows to engage in fraternization; the alternatives were scrounging and trading 
possessions for food on the black market to provide for children.  Fritz writes that “If 
many GIs sought the company of German women for sexual reasons, without doubt 
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many Ami-liebchens (GI sweethearts) pursued a relationship for material gain….”  A 
popular German song from 1945 reflected this sentiment, 
Do you live on (ration) card 3 baby, or do you have something else on the 
side, baby, a Jack, a Jim, from overseas, with chocolate and coffee and a 
large wallet with proceeds?  Don’t be so serious about love, baby, for a 
GI has so much more, baby, if he says ‘I love you,’ don’t say no, baby, 
just move to the land of the calories.89 
American occupiers accepted this arrangement with alacrity.  Fritz notes the 
observation of James O’Donnell in the December 1945 issue of Newsweek, 
“American soldiers pay no attention to German men.  To German women, they 
do.”90   
In possession of food and other luxuries, and with the defeated and absent 
German man as a foil, the American soldier laid claim to a portion of the German female 
population—food and cigarettes had conferred power and prestige on the American 
soldier.  William Cataldo was just one of these soldiers, but his access to an American 
mess provided him yet more status—he was where the food was.  Martha Donner and 
Ilse Muenzberg understood, as did other German women with their GI sweethearts, the 
benefits that could accrue to them in associating with Cataldo.  Indeed, for Ilse, working 
at the mess did provide her American rations, if only onsite during her shift.  For those 
Americans lucky enough to staff it, the mess afforded many inducements with which to 
woo a girl whom one fancied.  For Donner and Muenzberg, their relationships with 
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Cataldo, though transitory, bought them access to the abundance of the American mess.  
Cataldo, like many soldiers providing their rations to attractive women, was more than 
willing to supply food without regard to material profit, and Ilse and Martha were more 
than willing to eat the food so supplied.  When a proscriptive Army circular or theater 
directive had to compete with the affection of a young woman, the American supplied 
his rations, and the GI with access to the mess kitchen opened the pantry.  The next case, 
an investigation of the misconduct of Francis Belluscio, demonstrates that 
misappropriation as a form of illicit supply, a potential consequent to such mess access, 
was used not only to cajole and court a woman, but also had its place in more long term 
concerns. 
 Francis J. Belluscio was stationed with United States Forces, Austria, in Vienna 
starting in September 1946.  As a First Lietenant in the Army, Belluscio apparently 
distinguished himself to his superiors.  On January 22, 1947, Belluscio received an 
honorable discharge from the Army in order to take a position as an administrative 
officer for Special Troops Section, USFA, renewed annually as part of his contract.  On 
June 27, 1947, Belluscio was transferred to the Allied Secretariat at the Allied 
Commission Building as an administrative officer.  The chain of command, however, 
was unclear.  Because USFA Headquarters were located therein, the Allied Commission 
Building and its corresponding mess were under the operational jurisdiction of the 
United States Army, Headquarters Commandant.  As an administrative officer of the 
building, Belluscio was employed by the Department of the Army through the Civilian 
Personnel Section, administratively responsible to the HQ Commandant, Colonel John 
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Jenkins.  However, the Allied Secretariat, which housed the Allied Control Council 
responsible for the quadripartite administration of Austria, was also located in the Allied 
Commission Building.  As a result, on a day-to-day basis, Belluscio found himself 
functionally and directly responsible to Secretary Harold Pomeroy, who represented 
American interests on the Allied Control Council.  Pomeroy was himself responsible to 
Jenkins.  This arrangement caused a great deal of confusion, and the Inspector General, 
Major Fred Irwin, did attempt to ascertain the chain of responsibility regarding Jenkins-
Pomeroy-Belluscio, but Irwin never demanded a direct clarification.  However, this 
perplexing working relationship confounded even the men themselves, as is painfully 
obvious from Colonel Jenkins’s attempt to explain Pomeroy’s connection with the mess 
hall at the Allied Commission Building.  Jenkins confirmed that the mess “operated 
under his supervision,” and then attempted an explanation of Pomeroy’s position in this 
hierarchy. 
Well, he had charge and general supervision of that building, and the 
mess is part of that.  In other words, Mr. Belluscio was really an 
employee of his as well as mine.  He wasn’t directly under me—see, what 
I mean, I deal with him frequently on matters for Pomeroy, but he was 
really under Mr. Pomeroy and Pomeroy was under me.  But I did see 
considerable of Belluscio in matters pertaining to that building.91  
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The building was actually under the supervision of the Army, but its care fell to 
Pomeroy; the record does not state how the Secretariat and the Army negotiated this 
understanding.  Belluscio, and the enlisted men with whom he worked, believed that 
Pomeroy was a difficult superior, and there are intimations, at least from Belluscio and 
his staff, that Pomeroy did not respect his purview as Allied Secretary in pursuing an 
investigation against a civilian under the jurisdiction of the Army.  Belluscio noted 
pointedly that he felt it necessary to remind Pomeroy that he worked for the 
Headquarters Commandant, not the Allied Secretariat.92 
 Belluscio maintained his position as administrative officer at the Allied 
Commission Building from June of 1947 to February of 1948.  Belluscio’s actual duties 
were ill-defined.  He was responsible for the maintenance of the building, as an 
employee of the Headquarters Commandant.  In his testimony for the investigation, 
Belluscio remarked only “I ran the building, and I actually represented the four powers 
there as administrative officer.  See, before I was there they had two officers; one acted 
as mess officer and the other one ran the building.”  It is not certain how Belluscio 
“represented” the four powers.  Because he provided some kind of maintenance for the 
whole building, it is plausible that agents of all four powers—the Russians, Americans, 
British, and French—came to Belluscio with concerns about its operation.  
Notwithstanding his protests to the contrary, in practice, Belluscio’s main concerns were 
the smooth operation of the mess hall and the entertainment of the Allied Commission 
when it was in session.  Jenkins stated that Belluscio “was running the mess.”  
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Moreover, since the Army had combined the duties of the building and mess officer, 
Belluscio in fact retained charge of both.  The Allied Commission Building housed the 
secretariat for all four occupying powers in Austria, and the upkeep of the building 
devolved on each country for three months out of the year, which constituted a country’s 
period of “chairmanship.”  In practice, the mess became an American concern, 
regardless of who held the chairmanship; hiring for the mess occurred through the 
American section of the Allied Secretariat.  The Americans held the chairmanship from 
December of 1947 through February of 1948, and Belluscio controlled the daily 
operations of the mess at this time.93 
 The events recounted here cover the winter of 1947-1948.  The investigation 
undertaken by the Inspector General’s Department occurred in April 1948.  The 
investigation examined the validity of charges profferred by Harold Pomeroy in March, 
regarding the tenure of Francis Belluscio as director of the Allied Commission building 
mess.  Pomeroy charged Belluscio with numerous acts of misappropriation stemming 
from his association with the Allied Commission mess hall: misappropriation of food, 
the diversion of coal intended for the use of the Allied Secretariat, and a pattern of 
nonpayment for personal meals taken at the mess.  Transcripts of interrogations of those 
involved with the operation of the mess and the Allied Commission Building reveal a 
tentative tone in leveling charges at Belluscio.  Pomeroy labeled Belluscio’s actions 
“indiscretions,” and Jenkins hedged on his assessment of Belluscio’s behavior when 
discussing the allegations of misappropriation.  Reading between the lines, it is obvious 
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that Jenkins had reservations concerning the assertions of the Secretary, but he felt 
compelled to support Pomeroy’s position lest he upset the chain of command and 
undermine his subordinate’s authority.  Jenkins considered Pomeroy in the best position 
to assess the situation, as he had regular contact with Belluscio in the performance of his 
duties.  Jenkins remarked “…you’ve got to go with the man in charge of it, so I said that 
I would back the action recommended by Pomeroy.”  This hesitancy resulted from a 
heretofore unblemished service record, the superior quality of the mess under 
Belluscio’s tutelage, and the fact that Belluscio was well liked by his colleagues.  The 
record clearly shows that Belluscio exploited his position at the Allied Commission mess 
to divert food and coal for the use of his fiancée, who had recently given birth to a child.  
Based on preponderant evidence in the testimony, Irwin concluded that Belluscio’s 
actions were the result of his involvement with this woman.  The findings of Irwin’s 
investigation support the contention that misappropriation constituted a form of illicit 
American supply of rationed goods to the occupied population, and that such 
misappropriation occurred when an American formed a relationship with a (usually) 
German woman.  Given Belluscio’s excellent service record, Irwin concluded that were 
he not concerned with the support of his fiancée, he would have little motive to steal and 
divert government supplies.94 
Irwin premised the investigation of Bellusico’s misconduct upon his relationship 
with his fiancée.   Irwin asserted, “Most of Belluscio’s troubles appear to have arisen 
from his association with Mrs. Elsa M. Sehnke, a German national, with whom he has 
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been living for about two years.”  Belluscio met Elsa Sehnke in the fall of 1945.  
Belluscio recounted that they made one another’s acquaintance while she was working at 
an officer’s club which he frequented.  Sehnke had departed Germany for Austria to 
escape the Allied bombing of Dusseldorf, and took up work as an interpreter for the 
Department of the Army in Vienna.  Belluscio made known his romantic interest, and 
the two courted and took up residence together at her apartment, while Belluscio kept up 
his old residence to comply with Army billeting regulations.  Sehnke became pregnant in 
the spring of 1947, and Belluscio applied to USFA Headquarters for approval to marry 
her.  The Army denied the application on account of two instances of theft in 1941 and 
1943, uncovered in the course of a Counter Intelligence Corps investigation pursuant to 
Belluscio’s application for marriage.  The record demonstrates that Sehnke’s pregnancy 
precipitated Belluscio’s dereliction in misappropriating food and coal from the Allied 
Commission mess.95 
 Harold Pomeroy only gradually became cognizant of Belluscio’s misconduct.  
Pomeroy had been Chief of the Allied Secretariat, US Section, since September of 1945 
and was discharged from the Army, having attained the rank of colonel; he continued in 
his position as a civilian from June 25th, 1947.  Belluscio and Pomeroy maintained a 
tense working relationship, the result of an intuition on the part of Pomeroy that 
Belluscio was not to be trusted.  Pomeroy told Irwin “I was unfavorably impressed, for 
the sort of a thing that does not reduce itself to anything factual, but a general feeling of 
a lack of confidence in the person.”  Events confirmed this sentiment, as sometime 
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between December 20, 1947, and mid-January 1948, Pomeroy observed food being 
removed from the mess and taken away “in a jeep belonging to the administrative 
office.”  Pomeroy queried the Mess Sergeant, John Troy, regarding the incident.  Troy 
answered reluctantly that the noonday meal had been taken to Sehnke on Belluscio’s 
orders, and Pomeroy subsequently dropped the matter; his suspicions returned in late 
January, in connection to a request for coal.  Pomeroy was hosting an official function at 
his residence, and his requisition for coal did not reach Headquarters in time for this 
event; he asked the administrative office of the Allied Commission Building to spare 
him two bags, “to be returned the moment that my fuel was delivered.”  A member of 
the mess staff seemed surprised at Pomeroy’s insistence, stating “Well, why do you 
consider it necessary to return it?  This is American coke that’s being brought in here 
during our month, and Belluscio takes his all the time.”  Pomeroy now decided to pursue 
an inquiry into Belluscio’s actions, and gathered more information through discussion 
with Sergeants Troy and Nicholas Dattilio, who were the principals on Belluscio’s mess 
staff.  On the basis of these discussions, Pomeroy forwarded a formal complaint to the 
Adjutant General’s Office, which concurred in the termination of his employment and 
dispatched Major Fred Irwin of the Inspector General’s Department to ascertain the 
nature and extent of Belluscio’s misconduct.96 
 Though limited in its duration, the misappropriation alleged in the complaint was 
extensive.  The complaint—supported by the Adjutant General—charged that “nearly 
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every working day” from December 21st to January 31st, Belluscio had ordered an 
Austrian employee to drive a noonday meal from the mess to his fiancée.  “There is no 
regulation or practice in the Allied Commission mess that could possibly lead Mr. 
Belluscio to believe that it was proper for him to do this, either with or without 
payment.”  On three occasions during the same period, Belluscio had directed Austrian 
drivers to deliver coal “by Army vehicle to the billet of his fiancée.”  Also during the 
five weeks in question, the complaint charged Belluscio with taking a daily meal in the 
mess without payment.  The qualification regarding payment for the meals delivered to 
Sehnke is important, as it reveals that Pomeroy’s true concern was not the stealing of the 
meal.  In his questioning, Irwin phrased the government’s interest thusly: “Mr. Belluscio 
took advantage of his position to divert certain things to his own private use.”  The most 
egregious offense, in Pomeroy’s opinion, was the misappropriation of government 
property—Belluscio had used his authority over the mess to divert goods to someone not 
entitled access to them.  Even if Belluscio had paid for the meals, their subsequent 
distribution was unauthorized and sanctionable.97 
 Of Pomeroy’s charges, the Inspector General’s Department was most concerned 
with the diversion of hot meals from the mess for Sehnke’s consumption.  Mess Sergeant 
John Troy explained that Belluscio “…ordered my storeroom man to have a hot meal 
taken up to his—oh, to his place, which was a mile and a half from the building, and my 
storeroom man spoke to me about it every noontime….”  Troy realized that this practice 
was, at a minimum, irregular, but felt constrained by his subordinate position.  “Well, 
                                                 
97
 Col. W. Urbach, “Recommendation for Removal…”; “Interview of Technical Sergeant John Troy,” 
4/7/1948, Box 27, 2. 
  
85
he’s the officer in charge—it’s his responsibility; there’s nothing I can do about it; as 
long as he orders it he will have it.”  An Austrian kitchen hand prepared the meals and 
gave them to the mess driver, who delivered them to Sehnke’s flat.  Troy reckoned that 
this occurred for a few days at the end of December, and all but eight days in January.  
Troy was certain that Belluscio had not paid for the meals he misappropriated, because 
there was a regular system for payment “so as to show it on the books,” which Belluscio 
did not utilize.  Moreover, Belluscio, according to Troy’s calculations, took “13 
complete meals without paying” while working at the mess during the time of American 
chairmanship.98 
 The investigation uncovered that Belluscio understood the illegality of his 
actions.  The Austrians Michael Schneider, on kitchen staff, and Raymond Petlach, the 
mess driver, testified that Belluscio attempted to convince them that the meal deliveries 
were regular and authorized.  Schneider worked under Sergeant Troy, and confirmed 
that Troy had resigned himself to acquiescing in the diversion of a noonday meal.  
Beyond hot meals, Schneider divulged, Belluscio would also include leftover baked 
goods from Control Council meetings.  Belluscio told Schneider, “I’m the chief now,” 
and “I am to give you orders, and I do not want to do anything which is against the 
American government.”  Thenceforth, Schneider supposed that if a direction came from 
Belluscio, it constituted a legitimate command.  “That’s what he told me, so I thought it 
is alright, if he orders anything to me, I’ll fulfill his orders.”  Schneider maintained he 
was simply following orders; he enthusiastically placed responsibility with Belluscio, 
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and presumedly reaffirmed his innocence, in his final statement to Irwin: “I never have 
given anything away unless it came from Mr. Belluscio; that’s all I have to say.”99 
Petlach revealed that Belluscio also sent meals to Sehnke during September.  
Control of the Allied Commission mess returned to the Americans in December, and 
with Belluscio in charge, the deliveries resumed.  Schneider would have the meals 
packaged and waiting for Petlach, and Petlach would take them to Sehnke’s apartment 
on the Gersthofferstrasse.  Sehnke received four meals weekly in this manner, and when 
she entered the hospital on the 29th of December, Petlach delivered a mess meal there for 
ten days straight.  When she returned home with her daughter, meal deliveries occurred 
on the same basis as in December.  Petlach concurred with Schneider’s assertion that 
Bellsucio ran the operation, and told Irwin “…without order of Mr. Belluscio I could not 
leave [the mess].”  Too many people working at the mess were aware of Belluscio’s 
diversion of meals to his fiancée for him to survive the investigation without sanction.  
Furthermore, because Belluscio ran the mess, he lay exposed to his subalterns’ charges; 
everyone in the Allied Commission mess could truthfully place responsibility with him.  
These men did as they were told for the sake of their jobs, and only Belluscio would 
have an interest in delivering hot meals to his pregnant fiancée.100 
The Inspector General’s Department also looked into Belluscio’s illegal 
diversion of coal.  Pomeroy appeared to have understated the amount of coal which 
Belluscio misappropriated; the complaint alleged that at least three sacks of coal were 
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taken from the Allied Commission Building and delivered to Sehnke.  Irwin established 
that “During December 1947 and January 1948, Mr. Belluscio wrongfully diverted 
approximately one thousand pounds of coal from the Allied Commission Building…” 
and had this amount delivered to his fiancée.  Pomeroy ascertained only that “there had 
been a few sacks of coal taken out,” and did not pursue his inquiry further.  Sergeant 
Troy had discussed the matter with Petlach, whom Belluscio had further engaged to 
make the transaction with the coal, and asserted that the quota was three sacks of coal a 
week for three weeks.  Petlach verified Troy’s estimate, stating he delivered “about two 
to three fifty kilogram bags a week,” for about a month.  Troy feared that the removal of 
the coal would have broader repercussions, because while the food for the mess was 
solely the property of the American government, the coal was provided in equal measure 
by each of the occupying powers.  As a result, Belluscio was very likely stealing from 
stocks furnished by each country on the Allied Control Council.101 
Belluscio’s defense of his own actions immediately collapsed.  In his reply to 
Colonel Urbach’s “Recommendation for Removal from Civilian Employment,” he 
justified his misappropriation, but at the cost of inculpating himself.  Bellusico wrote 
“My resort to sending the convalescent some food was done without any subterfuge.  
This may have happened about fifteen times, after the first of the New Year and not as 
implied nearly every working day between 21 Dec-31 Jan.”  He had now proven the 
government’s case, regardless of whether or not the Inspector General’s Department 
would launch an investigation.  Belluscio used the frantic pace of work as an excuse for 
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the diversion of food and coal to Sehnke.  During the period of American chairmanship, 
not only had Belluscio acted as “Administrative officer,” but he also had charge of the 
kitchen and provided for the security of the Allied Commission Building.  During US 
chairmanship, Bellusico worked a fifty-hour week instead of the forty hours his position 
normally entailed; he had asked neither for time off nor compensatory pay.  As a result, 
“My duties at the Allied Commission Building during the US chairmanship month, made 
it difficult for me to take care of my family during the convalescence period of the 
baby’s mother.”  However, Belluscio would not have found it necessary to resort to this 
argument had he not misappropriated food and coal in the first place, his reply to charges 
begging the government’s point of contention.  Perhaps his work duties prevented him 
from providing for the care of his family, but he would not have had cause to 
misappropriate food and coal without a family to feed.102   
It is important to note that Belluscio did not send supplies to his apartment, but 
rather, to his fiancée’s.  That Belluscio did not pay for the food and coal merely 
demonstrates that he was cheap and dishonest.  Troy’s revelation that Belluscio filched 
his own noonday meals from the mess reflects this judgment.  He was not in financial 
duress; a pay increase had accompanied his assumption of duties at the Allied 
Commission Building as a civilian, and his contract, which stipulated renewal annually, 
had been extended for another year by the Department of the Army.  Pomeroy 
recommended, after securing Colonel Jenkins’s support, that the Army terminate 
Belluscio’s employment at the Allied Commission Building; Irwin concurred, and 
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further recommended that Belluscio be returned to the United States immediately, but 
stopped short of recommending prosecution.  Revealing that he was not pursuing the 
vendetta which Belluscio imputed to him, Pomeroy inquired after Belluscio’s pending 
marriage approval and attempted to expedite it, even permitting Belluscio to stay on for 
a few weeks in hopes that he might return to the United States with Sehnke and their 
daughter.  Pomeroy recounted 
At the same time [after telling Belluscio he deserved no consideration 
whatsoever], I did let him—discussed with him—the critical personal 
situation he was facing, and the extreme difficulty he would have if he 
had to return to the United States suddenly and then try to get his fiancée 
to the United States with a child already born, and the embarrassment that 
would be in his own community; and I attempted to sort out with him 
some sort of an answer that would give him some chance to hang on 
temporarily at the Headquarters for a few weeks only in the hope that in a 
few weeks his authorization to marry would come through.103 
Pomeroy explained why he extended this grace to Belluscio, stating “This was the result 
of sympathy for two people I believe to be very much in love and for their child.”  
Pomeroy’s inquiries yielded no results, and the marriage application was denied.  
Belluscio returned, alone, to the United States in the wake of the investigation.104     
The Department of the Army, in dispatching an investigator from the Inspector 
General’s Office, signaled its concern with Belluscio’s misappropriation.  Belluscio had 
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supplied government materiel to persons not entitled to access it.  Bryant argues that 
misappropriation in a military context is a serious offense, and as such is sanctionable, 
because of the peculiar mission of the military.  Unauthorized distribution or reallocation 
is detrimental to the cohesion of the military’s elaborate supply and requisitioning 
system and as such is inimical to the mission of the army.  Belluscio, in diverting to his 
fiancée meals and coal already allocated to service members (and William Cataldo, in 
supplying rations to his girlfriends), disrupted this system.  A meal that Belluscio 
supplied to Sehnke was a meal that a soldier could not consume, and the American 
Army had to make up the deficit; the same can be said for the coal.  However Belluscio, 
though stingy and deceitful, wanted to provide his fiancée and newborn child with food 
and warmth, and he used his position at the mess to supply these comforts.  Sehnke’s 
relationship with Belluscio warded off the hunger pangs accompanying an 
“unproductive worker” ration card.  Most importantly, Belluscio wielded purchasing 
power, but, when he felt unable to care for his convalescing fiancée and their newborn, 
he took advantage of his connection with the mess to provide the basic comforts of 
warmth and sustenance.   
With limited resources available to a given unit, and in the context of the severe 
food and coal shortage in postwar Germany, the Army determined that distribution of 
government food and coal to unauthorized persons constituted an unacceptable 
transaction.  Two realities on the ground in Germany detracted from the sanction of 
misappropriation.  In March of 1946, General Lucius Clay argued to Washington in 
requesting more food aid for Germany that “there is no choice between becoming a 
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Communist on 1500 calories [a day] and a believer in democracy on 1000 calories.”  
Fearing this might not move the hearts of War Department bureaucrats, he aimed for 
their minds (by aiming for German stomachs!).  “It is my sincere belief that our 
proposed ration allowance in Germany will not only defeat our objectives in middle 
Europe but will pave the road to a Communist Germany.”  Clay was combating a critical 
food shortage through the machinery of government, and as has been described, the 
ration card system imposed by the governments was failing miserably.  In these 
circumstances of scarcity, people sold and bought what they could on the black market, 
or foraged in the countryside and bartered with the resident farmers.  Women, “needy, 
attractive, and eager to please,” as Atina Grossman writes, could access another avenue 
for survival, leveraging their sexual charms in order to meet American soldiers and 
civilians, who had access to Class “A” rations and the unrivalled purchasing power of 
dollars.  American men gladly accepted the proffered companionship for food, and if a 
GI and a German woman fell in love, then the GI provided his rations on the basis of 
affection instead of supplying them on the strength of a sexual calculation; Grossman 
continues, “Very quickly, GIs concluded that if there had not been and ‘weren’t so many 
[German] men in Germany it would not be a bad country.’”  Severe scarcity on the one 
hand, and an American’s chances for female companionship and intimacy on the other, 
created a situation where food misappropriation became pervasive as a form of illicit 
American supply; those Americans, like Cataldo and Belluscio, who worked in mess 
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halls were best positioned to exploit this circumstance.  Sex and scarcity easily abated 
the force of military sanction.105 
The context of sex and scarcity is necessary to understanding misappropriation as 
a form of illicit American supply.  This supply was predicated upon American soldiers 
providing their rations to the occupied population.  This provision occurred in the 
context of a relationship with a local, usually a German woman.  German women used 
their sexuality, and the offer of companionship to lonely American soldiers, as leverage 
in acquiring both necessaries and material comforts.  This placed German women in the 
“paradoxical position,” Petra Goedde notes, of being providers for their families while 
being a dependent to an American soldier.  German women used their status as victims, 
as those needing protection, to take affirmative action in supporting themselves and their 
relations.  This placed women at the top of a hierarchy of access to American goods.  
While they claimed this agency, they yet relied upon the willingness of the American 
soldier to give of his bounty; they did, and misappropriation of American supplies 
occurred on a large scale.106    
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CHAPTER IV 
 
AMERICAN SUPPLIERS: LARCENY 
 
Both the Bremerhaven black market and the misappropriation of American goods 
depended upon the presence of an American soldier or civilian as an intermediary 
between the American installations whence these goods came and the indigenous 
populations to whom they were supplied.  Supply through the black market required that 
Americans illicitly distribute their bounty in exchange for currency.  The example of the 
Bremerhaven black market demonstrated how American cigarettes acted as a market 
currency, and only the Americans could supply this currency cheaply and in numbers 
commensurate to the support of the local economy.  Without American materiel and 
American soldiers impelled by the lure of profit, the black market in Germany would 
have existed as a barter economy tied to the transfer of local goods among Germans and 
displaced persons.  Petra Goedde writes, “The German underground economy to a large 
extent depended to a large extent on American GIs’ interest in exchanging food and 
cigarettes for luxury items.”  Of course, not everyone from the indigenous population 
had the ability to sell or purchase large quantities on the black market, or, especially for 
men, the ability to use sexuality to ward off penury and hunger.  There were many who 
wanted to enter the black market and sell for themselves, rather than negotiate with 
equally profit-hungry Americans.  Some Germans and displaced persons, desiring to 
feed their families without giving up the month’s earnings, or enrich themselves by 
selling on the black market, actively eschewed the American middleman in their quest 
for a piece of the American abundance.  The evidence suggests that most fell into the 
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latter category.  Yet these men too—and they were mostly men—ultimately depended 
upon an American supplier as much as the displaced person did when buying on the 
black market from an American or the German woman whose  Ami-liebchen supplied 
her food.  These Germans found a way onto the black market, and a means to riches, in 
stealing from Americans.  As such, they relied upon the American institutional 
presence—the depots, the motor pools, the hospitals—to acquire goods.   
This chapter demonstrates the existence of a third type of illicit supply predicated 
upon an American presence, in addition to the two previously discussed: stealing from 
American installations.  The desire to profit from black market activity simply motivated 
the decision to steal from American authorities.  Although many Germans and displaced 
persons avoided an American intermediary by stealing from American installations, they 
still depended upon the presence of these installations to profit on the black market.  A 
German or displaced person selling on the black market could do so because he had 
acquired American goods, which were only available as an ancillary effect of American 
occupation.  As a result, their black market operations were contingent on an available 
supply of American materiel pilfered from American installations without “insider” 
consent or cooperation.  Stealing from American installations was profitable because 
Germans and displaced persons could then divert the stolen goods to the black market.  
This chapter will first provide a brief exposition on the shortcomings of the official 
economy, a description of types of activity on the black market, and an explanation of 
how Germans participated in the black market.107   
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 At war’s end, some seventy-three billion marks were in circulation.  As 
inflationary pressure drove prices upward, the Reich found itself printing more bills.  At 
the same time, the state adopted rationing policies to mitigate the effects of food and 
materiel shortages.  This worried a German public that remembered Weimar that the 
mark would soon be worthless, a fear which in turn exacerbated inflation.  OMGUS 
policy staff arrived in Germany faced with severely inflated prices for an ever-declining 
volume of purchasable items, so that “large quantities of cash were chasing small 
quantities of goods.”  To confront this problem, the Americans instituted price controls 
and rationing.  The American and British occupiers chose to maintain controls 
established by German authorities, and in operating from these policies, the British 
insisted that they ought to be instituted as mandatory measures, not subject to debate by 
German civil government.  It was in this context that a nascent black market flourished 
during the years of occupation.  Richard Bessel writes that, “To a significant degree it 
was barter and the black market that formed the real economy of occupied Germany, 
rather than exchange at controlled, official prices.”  The official economy that existed 
was anemic, plagued by shortages and controls, and essentially bereft of the means to 
disburse raw materials.  The experience of the American and British-sponsored 
administrative department that had charge of the German economy highlights this 
economic breakdown.108   
In September of 1946, the British and American zones established German-run 
administrative agencies headed by executive councils, corresponding to government 
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ministries. Eight ministers, one from each state under American and British control, sat 
on every council.  The Economic Council attempted to address the severe shortage of 
raw materials, especially coal and steel.  The council was hamstrung ab initio because it 
had neither legislative authority nor executive authority sufficient to promulgate decrees 
binding upon the member states.  The unusually harsh winter of 1946-1947 proved 
particularly tough.  The harvest did not suffice to feed the population of the American 
Zone.  Exacerbating matters, a glut of Allied military marks (which circulated alongside 
old German Reichsmarks), precipitated by Soviet refusal to limit the use of American 
printing plates provided on good faith, sent inflation skyward, and led some Germans to 
secure what value remained in their savings through the purchase of postage stamps.  
Beyond this, import and export pricing for the German economy met with disapproval 
from European governments.  Price controls pegged German exports to the dollar and 
imports to the Reichsmark.  Thus, Italy, or Sweden, for instance, paid dollars for German 
exports, but accepted the Reichsmark for European goods.  European governments 
attempted to sell agricultural goods—fruits and grain—to the Germans, which proved 
unwelcome to the Americans on two counts, first because Clay had reserved Germany’s 
small dollar allotment for the purchase of raw industrial materials, and hence could not 
purchase food whose nutritive value could be provided in other ways, and second 
because the Germans themselves would have welcomed the introduction of fruits and 
vegetables into their thin diet; a refusal to purchase these luxuries was sure to be met 
with less than approbation from the German public.  Bizonal policy forced European 
countries into accepting a worthless German currency, while paying for German goods 
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by the dollar.  While other governments on the Continent grumbled about this 
inequitable exchange, Clay pursued price controls to prevent German exposure to the 
“international market,” as inflation was so rampant that prices in Germany “bore no 
resemblance” to the prices at which commodities were traded by other nations.  A rate of 
ten American cents per Reichsmark was the prevailing exchange rate for American 
soldiers, but this rate was wholly insufficient for exporting goods.  In this context, with 
European nations loathe to trade with Germany, American policy attempting to force 
these countries into accepting a discredited currency, inflation rates so steep that the 
Reichsmark was becoming valueless internally even with controls, and Clay having 
recourse only to a paltry store of dollars to purchase coal and steel, the black market 
flourished.109     
Wartime stocks of coal and steel had run out.  In 1946, steel firms in the bizonal 
area had produced only half of their potential mined raw material quotas.  Furthermore, 
this state of affairs left steel firms and ancillary industrial operations unable to increase 
productivity.  Small firms complained that they received neither coal nor steel from the 
state-run distribution system.  Desperately needing supplies, firms circumvented 
rationing controls, and began to barter with one another after material had been allotted.  
This was known as the “Compensation” economy, and its bartering created massive 
disparities of raw materials.  The director of the Economic Council, Viktor Argatz, 
resolved to put the German economy back in order, but was ultimately unsuccessful.  
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OMGUS military government detachments informed Argatz that the Economic Council 
did not possess a decretal authority, and could only publish regulations to which all 
member states had assented.  The British indicated they would publish regulations that 
the council developed, but American insistence on state supremacy sank this plan.  
Dissension among states dealt a second blow—Bavaria balked at providing requested 
quotas of grain, and the Social Democrat from North Rhine-Westphalia, Erik Nolting, 
pushed to legalize the bartering in which the firms engaged.  Until a satisfactory method 
of distributing scarce materials could be developed, bartering outside of the licit 
economy provided the best way for these firms to secure the wherewithal to meet and 
perhaps exceed their steel and coal quotas.  The licit German economy was broken; the 
illicit economy was not, and black market business boomed.110                
   Until its abatement with currency reform in June 1948, the shadow economy 
existed in multiple permutations of black market activity.  The postwar black market can 
be conceived as a spectrum of potential and realized activities and intentions, whose 
operators, in their exchanges, blurred the lines between legality and illegality, between 
the official and the underground economy.  “Black market” is a blanket term, which 
covered a range of behavior and illicit exchanges on the postwar illicit economy.  Hilton 
notes that OMGUS defined “illicit trade” as economic activity outside the “legal 
rationing and distribution systems,” and in addition to violating these controls, did not 
create tax revenue.  It is a definition appropriate for policy purposes, and describes the 
black market as an economic phenomenon, but it lacks explanatory power because it 
                                                 
110Clay, 169, 196; Steege, 50; Ziemke, 404; Van Hook, 131-133; Bessel, 374. 
  
99
neglects to describe the various types of transactions and behaviors that occurred in 
“illicit trade.”  In Black Market, Cold War, Paul Steege delineates four types of 
exchange or behavior, which he adapted from a contemporary primer on the postwar 
illicit economy.  This range of actions constituted most black market activity.111   
The first is underhand trade, which took the form of a demand for extra goods or 
services as a “prerequisite” for doing business.  A grocer would request a pound of 
butter prior to distributing some vegetables he had acquired; a doctor might ask for a few 
cigarettes before giving a patient an x-ray.  This did not constitute an exchange of 
rationed goods; rather, a potential consumer of the grocer or doctor would have to 
provide a rationed or controlled good simply to get access to whatever a seller was 
offering, either in the official or on the illicit economy.  The second behavior is barter or 
trade in kind.  In barter, there was an exchange of controlled and rationed goods “outside 
of the monetary economy,” so that no currency was involved.  The post-distribution 
trading of raw materials by coal and steel firms described by Van Hook typifies this 
particular black market behavior.  Items that could be put to use in Germany’s industrial 
sector often had controls placed on their distribution, specifying which entities could 
possess them and for what purposes.  A car manufacturer might request a die in 
exchange for a car or a pallet of tires; a mining company might exchange coal for 
pumping equipment.  Beyond this, of course, there was the barter economy in which 
individuals traded rationed goods—usually food—for whatever they had on hand, which 
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was most active between farmers in the countryside and city dwellers who would 
provide cigarettes, wine, furniture, and jewelry in exchange for eggs and vegetables.112   
The third type of behavior is black market trade, in which a rationed good (such 
as food or cigarettes) was exchanged for money.  The experience of the merchant 
seamen in Bremerhaven is an example of this; the seamen left their ships with cigarettes, 
which they would exchange for the Allied military marks or Reichsmarks of a local 
inhabitant.  At an Army post office, they could exchange this currency for dollars.  Black 
market trade in cigarettes proved to be a sure source of remuneration for the American 
looking for extra money.  It is important to note a distinction in terms: all forms of illicit 
exchange could be described as “black market.”  However, the phrase “black market 
trade” refers specifically to the exchange of rationed or controlled goods for money.  The 
final type of black market behavior enumerated by Steege is that of the German gross 
schieber, or “big operator,” which he defines cryptically as “professional” black 
marketeering or engaging in a racket.  Essentially, the schieber made his wealth, on the 
black market, selling and trading in large quantities of illicit goods.  The activities of a 
schieber could include any combination of illicit barter, black market trade, or 
underhand trade to gain access to an exchange.  The activities of a schieber were distinct 
from those of anyone else on the black market in that the schieber pursued a long term 
goal of financial aggrandizement.  These operators—Germans and displaced persons—
stole from the brick-and-mortar institutions of the American occupation and disposed of 
this materiel through illicit channels, either through illicit barter or black market trade.  
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Living well amidst shortage and want, they were generally ill-regarded in Germany, for 
they prospered, while their compatriots struggled in a daily hunt for calories.113 
The black market was the only economy capable of providing food and other 
household necessaries in the economic and societal chaos of the postwar years.  Most 
people had some contact with the black market, albeit intermittent and in small 
quantities.  Roesler writes “…almost the entire population was participating in illicit 
trading.”  Like prices in a normally-functioning official economy, prices for the black 
market varied by region: the markets in large cities featured higher prices than those in 
the hinterlands.  The Americans expanded the black market economy, with the cigarette 
as its de facto currency; with an average value of five Reichsmarks per cigarette, a two 
hundred-count carton could net an American a thousand Reichsmarks in profit, and the 
black market in the American zone sustained, on average, an annual return of 12,000 
percent.  As an example, American combat engineers building an airfield earned thirty 
dollars a day in 1948; with an exchange rate of twelve marks to one dollar, Steege notes 
that Germans found the dollar gap “insurmountable,” when the average wage for a civil 
servant in the American zone was 750 Reichsmarks.  As such, with lean incomes, native 
inhabitants pursued illicit barter; it became the most pervasive and popular form of black 
market activity.  Businesses soon began to pay workers with goods rather than money, 
and, as in the case of the coal and steel concerns, would trade with one another for 
scarce, controlled resources.  In Berlin, laborers went absent from their places of work, 
and students were truant from school, in order to forage in the countryside or barter with 
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other workers.  Many people showed up at their workplaces just enough to meet the 
attendance threshold requisite to receive their ration cards.  Steege writes that “The 
calculation to skip work to pursue food and other supplies elsewhere reflected the reality 
that the monetary wages one earned…could not compare to the benefits gained in 
occasional time spent foraging or bartering in the surrounding area.”114   
Some Berliners grew small gardens to augment their own diets or for barter or 
sale on the black market.  Occasional bartering as a means to survival was placed in 
sharp contrast with those, among them the gross scheiberei, who bought and sold 
wantonly in great quantities on the black market.  The former was considered 
appropriate in Germany’s present economic straits, while the latter was deemed to be 
thoroughly immoral.  Germans who resorted to bartering either to survive or perhaps 
obtain the occasional simple luxury represented a majority of black market transactions.  
The consistent and ubiquitous participation of Germans and displaced persons on the 
black market, combined with generous American injections of cigarette capital and PX 
luxuries like chocolate, coffee, and chewing gum, belied the anemic picture presented by 
the licit economy, and pointed to a powerful, latent economic potential hamstrung by 
price, distribution, and ration controls.  A testament to the true scope of this economy 
was the total illicit earnings of Americans on occupation duty in Europe.  Before the 
introduction of military scrip on September 30, 1946, the American Army had been 
overdrawn by $530,000,000, which constituted an amount in excess of what Congress 
had appropriated to the Army. Uninterrupted American injections of cigarette currency 
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and the staggering overdraft testify to the importance of American soldiers and goods to 
the postwar black market.  Reliance upon American supply in the maintenance of the 
black market was juxtaposed daily with German agency in the decision to barter and 
trade in order to survive in spite of draconian government rationing measures.115       
German laborers and white-collar workers would enter the black market hoping 
to sell “at exorbitant prices,” but most users of the market held regular jobs and came in 
search of specific products.  They used the black market for food or commodities not 
obtainable on a ration card, and then returned to work.  Unlike the schieberei, they had 
very little discretionary income available to deploy on the black market.  This meant that 
most workers either resorted to barter or sale of possessions (cutlery, clothing, furniture, 
food from successful foraging, ration cards) for extra money to spend on the black 
market.  Roesler notes that higher-salaried workers perhaps had an advantage in that 
they had more possessions, which equated to increased purchasing power.  In toto, 
income proved an iron constraint on the scope of a worker’s black marketeering; Roesler 
calculates that in the Soviet sector of Berlin, black market purchases accounted, per 
capita, for only 140 calories of food daily, which constituted less than ten percent of 
what one could purchase on a ration card.  American surveys estimated that two to four 
hundred calories of a German’s daily ration were procured on the black market.  This 
statistic suggests that, as a whole, Germans in the American and British zones took home 
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higher wages, but the food purchased on the black market still constituted a maximum of 
twenty percent of the OMGUS recommended caloric intake for normal workers.116 
 The historiography has conceptualized the black market as a construct and 
experience of Germans and displaced persons.  American action on the black market is 
generally presented in narrative form, as an aside, and then the American returns to base 
and is not heard from again.  Only Petra Goedde comes close to according a substantive 
black market role to Americans in her discussion of GI-German sexual relations 
predicated on the exchange of food, and this role is only implied in her 
acknowledgement that the size of the postwar black market depended upon American 
rations and PX luxuries.  In fact, Americans engaged in multiple, individual acts of black 
marketeering, and then exited the market.  Perhaps one soldier committed a single act, 
another a thousand acts, but they generally occurred as discrete events involving a single 
transfer of goods to a single black marketer.  The Americans, unlike the Germans and 
displaced persons, did not need the black market.  Germans went to the black market for 
food, displaced persons for almost every conceivable item.  As such, Germans and 
displaced persons maintained a longer-lasting, more intimate relationship with the black 
market.  Americans traded purely for profit on the black market, exchanging high quality 
cigarettes, chewing gum, coffee, and chocolate for currency or valuable trinkets which 
they could purchase cheaply; besides cigarettes, the other enumerated items could be 
redeployed as ersatz currency.  A GI or American civilian did not spend time on the 
black market because he could be caught, as maintaining contacts or building networks 
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required time and exposed him to American authorities; indeed, this time investment was 
unnecessary when a series of one-time exchanges could net a healthy profit or a valuable 
item.  He already had his pay and his rations, so black market trade was not a 
requirement of a comfortable sojourn in occupied Germany.117 
 The tactic of individual trades proved very lucrative for John Collins, an 
American civilian serving with OMGUS.  From October of 1945 until February of 1946, 
Collins received eighty-five cartons of cigarettes by post from his “wife and friends.”  
Collins used these cartons in individual instances of bartering for multiple items, 
including a second-hand camera, two pairs of binoculars, and a microscope.  He traded 
cartons with a gross schieber for tens of thousands of marks.  He sold three watches to a 
Russian soldier, and traded cigarettes for a leather briefcase and other leather items.  He 
traded other “small items” in exchange for cigarettes.  When the CID agent arrested him, 
he had in his possession almost 13,000 Reichsmarks from black market trading in 
cigarettes.  His confession includes the dubious statement “…nor have I intended to 
make a financial profit.”  Americans like Collins used their reliable access to cheap 
cigarettes and dollars sent by post to profit in multiple one-time trades with members of 
the local population.118  
Of course, not all Americans conducted as many trades as did Collins.  A CID 
investigation from December of 1947 implicated an American in misappropriation and 
illegal bartering.  Private J. Lepez desired a large quantity of wine for use at a party at an 
American engine-rebuilding plant.  He discussed his need with a German named 
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Senghas, offering four tires in exchange for the wine.  Senghas found it necessary to 
trade the tires for cement, the cement for Lepez’s wine, which required Senghas to meet 
with contacts who could offer cement and wine, and another friend who could store the 
tires on his premises.  Lepez, the American, executed a single trade, and the German had 
to work a chain of contacts to provide Lepez the requested good.  For Collins, though he 
engaged in multiple black market deals, he only conducted single-tier transactions.  
Lepez and Collins did not need anything; the former wanted a quantity of wine, and the 
latter wanted to make a healthy profit.  Both found single exchanges with individual 
dealers apt to their purposes.  Just as they appear in the literature, Americans moved in 
and out of the market providing cigarettes, tradable as currency, and then returned to 
their bases.119 
 American soldiers and civilians, then, did play a crucial role in the black market; 
they kept it supplied with currency, both real and ersatz.  A profit motive created the 
potential for a shortfall in black market goods, as Americans generally traded for extra 
cash, and then left.  In general, only women had access to the material benefits that 
accrued to an intimate relationship with an American.  The food Germans and displaced 
persons so desperately needed arrived on the market intermittently; supply could not be 
assured, given the cupidity of the farmers hoarding the food, the vagaries of weather and 
the harvest season, transportation difficulties, and OMGUS distribution controls on the 
free flow of victuals.  These areas of shortfall, evidenced by continued demand for 
contraband on the black market, allowed for a third form of American supply of illicit 
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goods: the larceny of American materiel from hospitals, depots, motor pools, and the 
like, by Germans and displaced persons.   
The stealing of American materiel reflected German and displaced-person 
agency in supplying goods to the black market not acquired through black market trade 
with Americans.  Stealing from an American supply depot, whether through burglary or 
an inside connection (usually a fellow indigenous worker), permitted Germans and 
displaced persons to acquire the luxuries and necessities to which they did not have 
access either through the licit economy or illicit bartering and black market trade.  At the 
same time, these thieves relied upon the presence of the American Army as the source of 
all this contraband materiel, securing for the Americans an important if unintended 
function on the black market, even in the absence of American military intermediaries.                    
When Germans and displaced persons were caught stealing and charged with 
larceny (as opposed to illegal bartering or black market activities), in the absence of a 
confession, the nature and quantity of stolen items served to signal intent to sell on the 
black market.  A single person, let alone a family, could not dispose of several cases of 
saccharine tablets, thousands of chocolate bars, or dozens of bedsheets through normal 
exertions. Moreover, the ubiquity of acts of thievery demonstrated a demand for the 
stolen articles and the consequent value people attached to them.  This is not to say that 
there were no thieves who appropriated their contraband for their own use, but the 
abundance of American contraband possessed latent wealth that could be repurposed to 
the thief‘s benefit and unlocked on the black market. 
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The CID reports provide further evidence of intent to divert pilfered items to the 
black market.  The payment of accomplices as an inducement to engage in larceny 
suggests a black market connection, as those who had participated in the larceny had 
often not yet disposed of their ill-gotten gain.  As a result, police reports revealing that 
principals were paid thousands of marks in exchange for their involvement also proved 
that they were not paid in the pilfered items, and that the money used for payment had 
not come from the commission of the crime under investigation.  The best salary a 
German civil servant could earn was 750 Reichsmarks monthly.  In Stuttgart in 1946, 
monthly wages for an industrial worker approached 140 Reichsmarks.  In 1947, a 
contemporary periodical calculated the monthly salary of the average white collar 
worker in Berlin, and arrived at a total of 230 Reichsmarks a month.  With salaries and 
wages so low, there was no licit way that a German national or displaced person could 
come into the possession of the thousands of Reichsmarks requisite for the payment of 
accomplices in a larceny.  Moreover, since the occupation authorities used Allied 
military marks as legal tender, and American supply depots, motor pools, and signal 
depots generally would have no reason to house reserves of currency, only black market 
exertions could be the source of such great amounts of lucre.120 
Three larcenies, investigated by the 481st Military Police Criminal Investigation 
Division, make clear the dimensions of the criminal theft of the schieber.  The larcenies 
occurred between May and December of 1947, at an American civilian club, an 
American salvage depot, and an American Red Cross supply depot.  The records 
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demonstrate the importance of having a contact inside the installation, which often 
obviated the need for burglary.  Both Germans and displaced persons, especially Poles, 
have a role in these events; they were often employed as guards at these installations, 
and they used their positions to pilfer supplies for the black market.  The Poles were 
notorious black market operators.  In March 1946, the Berlin Counterintelligence Corps, 
with the support of Berlin Headquarters military police, raided the lodgings of members 
of a mission of the Polish Provisional government in London, and found that the 
delegation was heavily involved in black market trading.  Members were selling and 
bartering at various billets registered to the mission, trading in all manner of goods.  
Inter alia, seized contraband included twenty-five packages of saccharine tablets, ninety-
five pairs of German military gloves, a “bale” of American uniforms, and dozens of 
dresses, jackets, and caps.  American authorities determined that many thousands of 
marks had changed hands in the transactions undertaken by this ring.  An intelligence 
bulletin of the Railway Security Division of the Provost Marshal General’s Office from 
February of 1946 noted that “It is known that Polish guards are heavily engaged in black 
market activities, particularly, in France where American supervision is negligible.”  In 
providing Poles and Germans, rather than Americans, jobs guarding valuable US Army 
materiel, American authorities were unwittingly contributing to the proliferation of the 
black market in Germany.  Occupation authorities were giving penniless, mostly 
displaced persons access to, and a modicum of control over, materiel that could fetch a 
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good exchange in barter or a high price in black market trade, exacerbating the black 
market problem the American military was attempting to control.121 
The first of the cases involves the theft of a quantity of American and German 
currency and luxury items from American civilian nightclub, “Club # 48.”  Apparently, 
the club had been the site of repeated instances of burglary throughout 1947.  The club 
had been burglarized during January, and three times during March when the club had 
been unoccupied, but nothing valuable had been carried off.  The club manager, Hans 
Linke, had been sleeping in the building’s offices on the night of 29-30 May, when it 
was broken into; he slept soundly through the commission of the crime, and woke to the 
fireman Albert Maier, who had gone to shovel coke in the basement and discovered that 
the window was open, with the pane smashed, and that a ladder had been propped 
against the wall, leading outside to the garden.  Further investigation revealed that the 
club’s safe, which contained its operating funds, was missing.  Maier and Linke went 
straightaway to inform the club’s treasurer, George Welsh, who called the 481st MP 
Battalion to report the burglary.122 
The larceny was instigated at the urging of Giovanni Gentile, an Italian who 
worked at the club, though the record does not state what his position was.  On May 20, 
1947, Gentile suggested that his friend Mischko Wehabovic, a Polish displaced person, 
commit a larceny of Club # 48’s safe, the location and contents of which Gentile was 
aware.  Wehabovic demurred; for over a week, Gentile persisted, requesting that 
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Wehabovic enter the premises and remove the safe with its contents.  The two discussed 
the how to effect an entry and the particulars of the location of the safe and other 
valuable items.  Gentile approached Wehabovic on the 29th, and indicated that the 
currency in the safe would be removed by the first of June; if he wanted to commit the 
robbery, he would have to do so that night.  Gentile indicated that the safe contained 
about two thousand dollars, and a few gold wristwatches.  A chamber in a desk drawer 
contained a camera and a cigar box with a few hundred dollars.  Gentile requested 
50,000 marks for the information he was providing contingent upon the successful 
execution of the larceny.123 
A worn down Wehabovic finally consented after their discussion, and determined 
that he needed assistance to break in and remove the safe.  He enlisted the help of two 
displaced persons, Kosta Kikilidis and Waldemar Bulhakov, explaining to them the 
location and contents of the safe.  At 4 a.m. in the morning, the three men met at 
Wehabovic’s residence, and proceeded to the club.  They lifted a grate with access to a 
window in the coal room, gained entry, and proceeded upstairs to the treasurer’s office.  
The loot was far more valuable than Gentile had indicated.  A receipt drawn up for the 
stolen goods by the treasurer of the 481st MP Battalion, and provided to Welch, lists 
American scrip worth almost five thousand dollars, twelve thousand Reichsmarks, six 
wristwatches, two radios, and two cameras.  As if this windfall were not enough, 
Wehabovic subsequently liberated four bottles of liquor from the office closet.  They trio 
hid the safe in a local park, and Wehabovic and Bulhakov returned with a bicycle to 
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transport the safe; Wehabovic took the safe to the apartment of an acquaintance, asking 
that the renter, Sever, to hold the safe for him for an unspecified amount of time.  Sever 
considered his circumstances differently, and under the pretense of looking for tools to 
crack the safe, he returned with members of the military police.  The trio was arrested 
and charged with larceny, and Gentile was later seized and charged with conspiracy to 
commit a larceny.  All the stolen goods were recovered.124 
Whatever his duties, Gentile somehow had access to information about the club’s 
funds.  There is no direct evidence of diversion to illicit channels, if only because the 
perpetrators were seized right after the commission of the crime.  The large take in 
currency does not indicate resort to the black market; the American scrip would certainly 
be very useful on the black market, but the Reichsmarks could be spent on the licit 
economy, and the only information Gentile volunteered about the dollars was that he 
wanted them.  An assessment as to their final disposition would be pure speculation.  
What suggests black market intent in this case is Gentile’s interest in the radios and the 
cameras.  The concern over the dollars demonstrated that Gentile was interested in the 
value the dollar represented, though he might find a way to dispose of them outside of 
black market trading.  However, given his concern for wealth, it is possible to establish 
black market intent through the acquisition of the radios and cameras.  The dollars 
represented real wealth, and the decision to steal both the radios and the cameras 
indicates that he hoped to realize a profit from them as well.   
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Cameras and radios had a very high resale value in black market trade, and 
bartered well.  In one CID report, a certain Master Sergeant Sylvester Lippl, stationed at 
Attaburg, Germany, had his camera stolen from him in late December 1947.  On New 
Year’s Day, his camera was sold to an American who paid thirty dollars for the camera, 
and returned it to Lippl.  The soldier bought the camera from a German, Alfred Peuser, 
who had paid 1,500 Reichsmarks for it from another German.  This was quite a sum, 
considering that Germans took home monthly salaries of no more than a few hundred 
marks.  A radio could be disassembled and sold for parts, which could net a larger profit 
than the radio itself.  Authorities in the town of Lorch captured Elizabeth Rothermel with 
139 American radio tubes after conducting a search of a train bound for Cologne; 
Rothermel confessed that she intended to sell them on the black market, hoping to pay 
for the treatment her husband’s nephritis entailed.  Her son Ludwig worked as a 
mechanic at the US Signal Depot in Mannheim, and a colleague informed him that he 
was selling radio tubes for 30 Reichsmarks apiece.  Ludwig Rothermel stated “As my 
parents had lost all as a consequence of an air-raid, I intended to use the tubes for 
compensation.”  After confirming the soundness of the tubes, he purchased the 
aforementioned quantity for 4,500 Reichsmarks and gave them to his mother.125   
The case of the Club # 48 larceny and the experience of Elizabeth Rothermel 
affirm the importance of inside contacts in the facilitation of larceny from American 
facilities.  Gentile, though he was not a principal in the larceny at Club # 48, had 
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knowledge of the high-value items in the treasurer’s office and knew the layout of the 
building, both invaluable pieces of information in planning and executing the break-in.  
Ludwig Rothermel’s position as a mechanic at the Signal Depot gave him access to 
valuable equipment, and his colleague had direct, authorized access to the radio tubes, 
precluding the need for a burglary.  While the mere presence of a well-stocked American 
installation potentially made it a target of theft, hiring indigenous workers with entrée to 
the premises and equipment was essentially giving away the store.  Such arrangements 
constituted a patent security breach.  Perhaps the most telling (and absurd) examples of 
this assessment involved those instances in which Germans and displaced persons 
guarding American supplies took advantage of their positions to commit larceny.  
Though electronic equipment fetched a high price in black market trades, those who 
purchased from dealers desired more than just food and luxury appliances.  The next 
case demonstrates that Germans and displaced persons were looking for more mundane 
comforts, amid the societal disruption of the postwar years, of a kind only available in 
American supply depots. 
The second case concerns a larceny at the United States Army Salvage Depot in 
Friedrichsfeld, Germany.  On July 2, 1947, four security guards at the depot conspired to 
ascertain what materiel was housed in one of the compound’s warehouses, with the 
intention of stealing what they found.  Two of the guards entered the warehouse and 
carried off 250 pairs of pants, property of the American Army, in five sacks.  The record 
seems to support the contention, unstated, that these men were working for a gross 
schieber; he arranged for the payment of those who participated in the larceny, as well as 
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the subsequent transportation and disposition of the pants.  He was not involved in the 
planning or execution of the crime, only coordinating events after the perpetration of the 
larceny.  The guards used their positions to filch from the very premises that they were 
hired to protect.  The schieber, and the principals in the crime, used their black market 
contacts and personal acquaintances to dispose of the pants.  The involvement of the 
schieber bespeaks the potential black market value of the materiel stored in the 
warehouse; a schieber had multiple contacts in the black market, the means to dispose of 
stolen goods, and the funds (from previous black market transactions) to reward those 
who participated in the crime and the disposition of the goods.126     
Otto Arnold, Georg Weber, Otto Reinemuth, and Siegfried Aderhold were 
working as security guards for the US Army Salvage Depot during the night of July 2, 
1947; they were all assigned to a certain post outside one of the warehouses in the depot 
compound, detailed to a six-hour shift.  Weber and Arnold told Reinemuth at 10 p.m. 
that they planned to break into the warehouse that night and determine whether it held 
anything of value.  Weber and Arnold entered the warehouse and removed the clothing, 
while Aderhold stood watch directly outside.  The three men carried the sacks to a 
roofed shed to wait until their shifts expired.  Around 1 a.m., Weber and Arnold returned 
to the guard post, informing Reinemuth that they had broken into the warehouse and had 
seized 250 pairs of trousers in five sacks.  Weber and Aderhold then left for the night, 
transporting the sacks to Weber’s apartment where they would be kept temporarily.  It is 
difficult to determine who knew about the plan to break into the warehouse prior to the 
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commission of the act; Aderhold denied that he participated in the larceny or had 
previous knowledge, but admitted that he assisted in the transport of four sacks to 
Weber’s apartment.  Given that Weber and Arnold both implicated Aderhold, that all 
men were present at a post outside the warehouse, that Aderhold assisted in the 
transportation of the sacks, and that Reinemuth asserts he was left at the guard post alone 
during the larceny, it is probable that every man knew about the larceny prior to the start 
of his shift.  Every principal affirmed that Reinemuth did not participate in the execution 
of the larceny.127 
The schieber emerged in the aftermath of the warehouse larceny.  In the course 
of the investigation, Rolf Gebhard, a fellow guard, was implicated neither in the 
conspiracy nor the larceny, but directed the actions of the other guards regarding the 
storage of the trousers, orchestrated payment of the participants, and mediated the supply 
of the pants to various black market contacts.  According to Alderhold, he informed 
Gebhard of the larceny while it was in progress, but Gebhard’s subsequent actions belie 
this statement.  Aderhold visited Gebhard, informing him that Arnold and Weber had 
stolen the pants.  Gebhard contacted a friend by the name of Emil Hammersdorf, who 
arranged for a driver to bring the sacks over to his residence.  Gebhard’s narration of this 
incident suggested that this was one of many business transactions which Gebhard 
handled, that Hammersdorf was waiting for these goods just as he had for the fruit of 
other larcenies or black market transactions.  “Thereupon Hammersdorf knew that at 
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Weber’s home at Friedrichsfeld stolen American goods were placed and ready to be 
shipped out.”  Hammersdorf, Aderhold, and an unidentified driver took the sacks to 
Gebhard’s residence.  The driver, though he professed no knowledge of his load, 
received ten pants for his trouble.  Gebhard gave Weber one of the five sacks as 
payment, and Arnold received “6000.-Marks, said money being my share of the 
proceeds of the purchase of the American pants.”  Reinemuth received 4,500 
Reichsmarks for keeping watch at his post during the larceny.  Aderholt received fifteen 
pairs of pants.  Gebhard gave Hammersdorf ten pairs of pants for his own use.  These 
disbursements required that Gebhard have the resources to provide payment, which he 
acquired through resort to the black market; the amounts of currency he took in, and the 
corresponding number of buyers required to make such a profit, indicate a demand for 
clothing which the theft from the Friedrichsfeld depot met.128 
Gebhard profited handsomely on the black market, and the participants in the 
larceny saw success as well; indeed, providing the other guards with pants as opposed to 
currency testified to the value they possessed in barter or black market trade.  Arnold 
and Reinemuth received their cash payments totaling 10,500 Reichsmarks. Like any 
good schieber, Gebhard had established a network for the disposition of stolen material.  
The record reveals that some of the transactions occurred through the other guards and 
persons whom Gebhard supplied with trousers for the purpose of black market trade.  
These contacts sold the trousers for cash, and then returned the proceeds to him.  
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Gebhard narrated “50 pairs of pants were sold thru [sic] Hammersdorf, he handed me the 
amount of 4500.-Marks (which originates from the sale of the pants) for safe-keeping.”  
He also gave thirty pairs of pants to one Elizabeth Ramseier, which she sold for 5,330 
Reichsmarks to a tailor, Rudolf Becker, who needed the material.  Gebhard, however, 
was not above selling the goods himself; Ramseier remarked that “Gebhard asked me to 
introduce him to people who would like to buy pants.”  Gebhard then hawked his 
clothing at a local inn near Friedrichsfeld, and one Nelli Fieger purchased ten pairs for 
fifteen hundred Reichsmarks.  Cloth was a scarce commodity in postwar Germany.  
Fieger explained, “Because I have not very much clothing, I liked to get the pants fixed 
for clothing for me and my husband.”129    
Those guards whom Gebhard had paid with the stolen pants went straight to the 
black market as well.  Reflecting the pervasive concern over food scarcity, Weber used 
his share of the steal to acquire calories.  “I exchanged my sacks of American pants for 
victuals,” he recounted, but was arrested before he could pick up the food.  Reinemuth, 
likewise, looked to assuage his hunger pangs through his Reichsmarks.  “I used the 
money to buy victuals on the blackmarket [sic].”  Aderholt sold his share of the trousers 
the day after the larceny to one Kurt Vock, for two thousand Reichsmarks.  The money 
was still in Aderholt’s possession when CID agents arrested him, and he expressed his 
willingness to turn his earnings over to the military police.  The military police 
interrogated Vock, only to find out that he sold twelve pairs of trousers to an 
unidentified person; Vock had significantly undervalued his purchase, receiving 240 
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Reichsmarks for the entire bundle.  “I am an invalid and receive no financial support.  I 
used the 240.-Marks for my livelihood.”  The record does not indicate how Vock was 
able to spend two thousand Reichsmarks without work or other financial support, or 
what compelled him to then resell them for ten percent of the price at which he 
originally purchased them.  Hammersdorf sold twenty-five pairs of pants for five 
thousand Reichsmarks to an acquaintance Fritz Kluh; once again, the military police 
could not retrieve any of the stolen goods, as Kluh had used them in barter with a French 
soldier, exchanging them for fifty liters of wine.  Wine was a very valuable black market 
resource, but there were some instances when, instead of trading for currency, the chain 
stopped and some sellers actually resorted to the intended use of the traded article.  Kluh 
noted dryly, “I drank the wine already.”  After the schieber had distributed the loot to his 
contacts and acquaintances, they in turn provided for the proliferation of these articles 
through the market, selling them to others.130 
The distribution of the trousers to multiple contacts who then returned funds to 
Gebhard, and the selling and reselling of the pants, speak eloquently to their black 
market demand, which was itself a result of a lack of quality cloth and readymade 
articles of clothing.  The Friedrichsfeld larceny is typical of the manner in which goods 
were distributed on the black market; as long as the goods were in demand and in good 
condition, there was potential for long term resale.  Clothing was an article not 
obtainable through transactions with other indigenous inhabitants.  A tailor like Becker 
could use it to sustain his business, and others like Nelli Fieger could repurpose 
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American clothing and fashion new wardrobe items and make repairs to worn jackets 
and pants.  It was useful in and of itself, beyond its potential as a tradable commodity.  
Germans could provide food (albeit unevenly and at inflated prices), jewelry, and 
furniture; due to the shortages of raw materials, they lacked the resources of industry to 
make electric appliances, tools and utensils, and textiles.   
Only the Americans had certain access to these goods.  The black market was the 
only channel through which Germans might acquire them.  Stealing from American 
installations met a demand that could not otherwise be filled.  These goods were 
available as a subsidiary function of the occupation, so that thieves relied upon the 
presence of American troops for access to the equipment they brought with them.  
Americans in turn exacerbated the black market problem they sought to prevent by 
hiring the very people needing these goods—people possessing neither means nor access 
to purchase them on the licit economy.  Beset by ubiquitous and pervasive scarcity, 
indigenous workers understood that the benefits of stealing American goods—a new 
suit, a few thousand marks, or fifty liters of wine—far outweighed the risks of capture.  
As such, American installations, the repositories for this largess, acted as sources of 
black market materiel.  In this way, theft from American installations constituted a type 
of American illicit supply.  Hiring indigenous workers in postwar Germany was 
tantamount to inviting a burglar into the house.  The black market provided so much and 
Germans and displaced persons possessed so little.  However, scarcity ran so deep that 
items classifiable neither as outright luxuries nor ersatz currencies nor household 
necessaries maintained a black market value.  The final case is an examination of some 
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Poles who broke into a Red Cross warehouse for its stocks of towels.  With such a dearth 
of material goods, even the lowly towel sold for a pretty penny on the black market.131 
On July 31, 1947, the 481st Military Police Battalion received a call from Otto 
Memmer, the director of the American Red Cross Warehouse at Rheinau, Germany, 
reporting the theft of six hundred towels from the warehouse.  The suspects were two 
Polish displaced persons, Jan Kaczmarek and Jan Kmieciak, whom Memmer had hired 
as guards; they were interrogated and confessed to complicity in the theft.  The principal 
in the larceny, a Pole by the name of Karolack, fled Rheinau and could not be 
apprehended.  During the night shift on July 30th, Kaczmarek and Kmieciak were 
keeping watch at adjacent posts outside the stockroom in question.  Around 10 p.m., 
Karolack approached Kaczmarek and asked whether he might enter the premises, as “he 
had the intention to procure something for himself.”  Karolack offered the promise of 
marks in exchange for his acquiescence, and Kaczmarek acceded to his request.  
Karolack requested the permission of Kmieciak, who recalled “He furthermore 
explained to me that he intended to steal towels.  He offered me money, however, I told 
him that I would not let him enter the depot for money, but as a favor being his 
comrade.”  Kmieciak reported that at 11:30, he saw Karolack, accompanied by a 
civilian, carrying sacks from the warehouse.  The next morning, Karolack paid each 
guard 1,500 Reichsmarks in exchange for their permission and subsequent silence.  
Karolack had arranged with a German, Victor Huebner, to sell the stolen towels through 
illicit channels.  Once again, larceny occurred not because the thief sought to turn the 
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stolen goods to his own use, but rather as a result of perceived demand on the illicit 
economy.132 
The day of the larceny, Huebner had visited an acquaintance, a German named 
Otto Duschl, and inquired as to whether he would be interested in receiving a quantity of 
stolen goods.  Duschl attempted to ascertain the provenance of the articles, and Huebner 
replied that he could provide particulars later in the evening.  Huebner returned at 9 p.m., 
stating that he had access to American towels.  Soon after midnight, Huebner arrived 
with Karolack at Duschl’s residence and offered 150 towels, adding that another 450 
needed only to be picked up from the warehouse.  Huebner and the two Poles arrived at 
Duschl’s with the remainder a little later that night.  Duschl paid nine thousand 
Reichsmarks, which Huebner shared with the Poles; Huebner received nine hundred 
Reichsmarks for his service in providing a contact on the black market.  As payment for 
the theft, Karolack took the remaining sum and gave a third to the guards, as previously 
noted.133   
The larceny went forward because Huebner was certain a desire existed for the 
commodity; it is important to note that Huebner visited Duschl prior to the larceny, to 
insure that he had a buyer.  Duschl purchased the goods in anticipation of black market 
trade; indeed, he was able to sell what he had purchased from Huebner, exchanging the 
450 towels with an unknown individual for nine thousand Reichsmarks, recouping his 
original outlay.  The 481st Military police Battalion took custody of the remainder, 122 
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towels, and just over ten thousand Reichsmarks, confiscated from Duschl at the time of 
arrest.  Polish security guards—with legitimate access to the warehouse—perpetrated the 
larceny.  Huebner acted as a middleman, mediating the transfer of the stolen goods to 
Duschl, his black market contact.  In turn, Duschl exchanged the greater portion of the 
towels for his total purchase price.134      
The value of the goods expropriated in larceny was not a function of their 
intrinsic purpose, but the value they could fetch on the black market, which was itself a 
reflection of a demand for goods impelled by pervasive scarcity throughout all sectors of 
the economy.  The American Red Cross Warehouse contained a supply of some of these 
scarce goods, and the certainty of remuneration in black market trade made larceny a 
fiscally attractive proposition.  An ultimately shortsighted American decision to hire 
indigenous workers placed those who lacked the most in a position that provided them 
the opportunity to mitigate or eliminate that want.  The lure of black market profits 
proved too much temptation for those guarding the American bounty, and American 
installations were therefore consistent targets of theft.  This theft supplied Germans and 
displaced persons with goods not available to them through a licit economy plagued by 
shortages and shortcomings in the state-run distribution system, ergo, constituting a type 
of American illicit supply to the indigenous population.  Theft from American 
installations with intent to divert the stolen goods to the black market, while contingent 
upon the existence of an American presence, provided Germans and displaced persons 
agency which belies the common German perception of the black market as a place 
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where they were exploited, victims to the imperative of an unfettered market and 
unscrupulous sellers.  Beyond choosing not to access the black market, Germans could 
use the black market to their advantage, making money through selling stolen goods.  
These persons turned the prevailing conditions of want, and the existence of a 
flourishing black market, to their favor.  Selling stolen goods permitted Germans and 
displaced persons a way to escape want, and even to profit amidst postwar shortage.  
This assessment of black market operations is in line with Steege’s argument that 
Berliners possessed an agency Americans and Russians did not attribute to them, an 
agency which they realized in daily negotiating the black market and planning survival 
strategies.  The activities of thieves and schieberei suggest that, as individuals, not all in 
Germany were powerless and in need of protection, despite the national assumption of 
the mantle of victimhood which Goedde asserts occurred in postwar Germany, or 
German notions of helplessness vis-à-vis the preferential treatment and black market 
activities of displaced persons, as Grossman argues.  Exploiting the presence of well-
stocked American installations, some Germans successfully chased wealth amidst 
widespread penury.                                         
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
In June of 1945, Captain J.F. Collins, stationed at Washington, D.C. with the Army 
Service Forces, interviewed Technical Sergeant James Hutchison.  Hutchison had 
recently been in France, and as a matter of personal interest, had studied the operation of 
the black market as it existed in Fontainebleau, just outside of Paris.  American soldiers 
were participating enthusiastically in the black market.  The present military rate of 
exchange for currency was fifty francs for a dollar, whereas black market currency 
exchanges had set the rate at two hundred fifty francs for the dollar.  Moreover, the 
French knew the franc was losing its value, and had begun buying dollars in anticipation 
of its continued declension.135 
 Thus, a scheme had arisen whereby Americans would send home for American 
dollars, and subsequently sell this currency on the Paris black market at breathtakingly 
inflated rates.  The French would either provide merchandise, which for many 
Americans was prohibitively expensive if paid for in francs, or provide francs at the rate 
of one hundred per dollar.  The French had set high prices for American soldiers; in 
order to fund their existence in Paris, GIs were hawking cigarette cartons for a thousand 
francs and their government-issue shoes for forty or fifty dollars.  “A gingham dress that 
would sell for three or four dollars in the United States, sells for twenty-two hundred 
francs in France.”  Hutchison remarked that “there is sufficient food and general 
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merchandise in France, but the black market had diverted most of it from the legitimate 
market.”136   
 American soldiers had used a loophole in existing regulations to convert black 
market francs to dollars on money orders, sending home far more money than they had 
earned in base pay.  As long as a soldier declared his francs as winnings from a poker 
game, no questions were asked, and clerks at any Army Post Office would convert the 
“winnings” in francs to dollar credits.  Black market transactions had left the French in 
possession of excess currency as well.  Collins wrote that, “in order to offset this 
currency manipulation, the French government is selling bonds in an attempt to absorb 
the excess money held by Frenchmen.”  Hutchison blamed the black market on French 
youths who had become adept at “dodging regulations” during the war.  The report 
levied no blame on the Americans, who, like their counterparts in Bremerhaven, were 
financing the market with illicitly acquired American dollars and cigarettes.  American 
authorities in Germany were likewise concerned with the illicit activities of their 
troops.137 
In September of 1945, Lucius Clay felt compelled to address the conduct of 
American troops stationed in Berlin as part of the recently established Office of Military 
Government, United States.  “Unlawful acquisition of private property by U.S. personnel 
has assumed such proportions as to embarrass this Command and reflect discredit on the 
United States and the principles of fair play and decency associated with our country.”  
During the summer of 1945, American troops affiliated with the occupation had been 
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stealing items from the houses in which they were billeted.  Clay indicated that “No 
matter what the subterfuge or guise employed, the removal of private property without 
authority is unlawful.”  The final disposition of property transferred between houses 
“without recording the transfer is merely another phase of looting.”  Clay’s concern was 
deep enough to address this rash of “unlawful” acquisitiveness through a letter circulated 
to all civilian and military personnel in Berlin and its environs.  There is no way to tell 
from Clay’s letter whether any items from private billets found their way to the black 
market.  Given that Clay believed the problem of looting in billets had assumed “such 
proportions as to embarrass this Command,” the scope alone suggests that some items 
seized by American soldiers were ultimately exchanged on the black market.  Clay 
concluded that the consequences of this extensive misappropriation were dire, as looting 
“undermines the position of respect and confidence necessary for effective Military 
Government administration.”138 
The relevant historiography has sustained two arguments: first, that Germans considered 
the black market activity prevailing in their midst a phenomenon perpetrated by 
foreigners, especially displaced persons; and second, that this conceit became an integral 
part of a constructed German victimhood in the postwar years.  Laura Hilton has also 
argued that the Germans saw the Americans as conspirators in the establishment and 
maintenance of the black market.  The existence of the black market, and Germans’ 
daily resort to its wares, constituted an omnipresent reminder of the societal upheaval 
and concomitant lawlessness of the postwar years.  Forced to reconcile pervasive 
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German activity on the market with the notion that the black market was the product of 
external forces, Germans established a dichotomy of activity on the black market: 
activity for survival, which was considered right and moral given the existence of 
scarcity in the postwar years; and activity toward self-enrichment, the realm of the gross 
schieberei and foreigners, behavior met with calls for the death penalty in the 
punishment of black market offenses.  This dichotomy was part of a shared sense of 
victimhood among Germans.  Germans had been victims of Hitler’s histrionics, and now 
they were victims of Allied occupation policies and the favoritism they bestowed upon 
the population of displaced persons. 
Goedde argues that shared cultural practices allowed the Americans to adopt this 
sense of victimhood, and act as protectors of the German people.  This, rather than 
calculations concerning the balance of power vis-à-vis Moscow, in turn paved the way 
for the subsequent Cold War.  Malte Zierenberg demonstrates that the Germans 
considered themselves victims of unscrupulous foreigners on the black market even 
before the end of the war.  Stephen Fritz echoes Goedde’s assertion, arguing that as the 
fraternization ban was steadily eroded, both Americans and Germans came to see the DP 
camps as loci of violence, filth, and black market activity; therefore, the black market 
became a foreign problem, rather than a German one.  Anita Grossman posits that in 
assuming the mantle of victims, Germans refused to acknowledge how they came to be 
in this circumstance and how the displaced persons, whose presence and actions they 
excoriated, had arrived in Germany in the first place.  Laura Hilton explains how, despite 
data and compelling anecdotal evidence to the contrary, Germans blamed illicit trade 
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“not on the war and its aftermath, but on others.”  In this way, Germans collectively 
avoided responsibility while constructing a community of victims, which served as a 
coping mechanism amid the societal collapse subsequent to defeat.139 
Second, the historiography has maintained that illicit trade was primarily a 
German experience.  The black market was a location mediated, negotiated, and 
controlled by Germans and displaced persons—a historiographical conclusion affording 
no space for Americans on the postwar black market.  In the literature, Americans have 
been portrayed in narrative fashion, simply to illustrate that, indeed, Americans did 
engage in black market activities.  American soldiers and civilians would sell their 
cigarette cartons or their PX chocolate, and then disappear from view; it was the 
Germans who had daily resort to the black market, and both Germans and displaced 
persons used the black market as a space for contesting victimhood.  Germans needed 
food from illicit trade, displaced persons lacked everything, having ended the war with 
nothing, and looked to the black market to ameliorate this state of total want.   
Enssle and Roesler have argued for scarcity as a motivating force in creating the 
strategies that Germans used to survive, setting up the conditions necessary to support 
Steege’s argument for the black market as an expression of German agency. Goedde has 
correlated the extent of the black market with the willingness of Americans to provide 
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cigarettes, rations, and PX luxuries to Germans, but discusses how women leveraged 
their sexual capital to survive.  Steege argues that the black market was entirely a 
German affair, a means by which Berliners, previously imagined as the pawns of Cold 
War superpowers, actively reclaimed control of their fates and exhibited agency in 
undermining Allied edicts and price and ration controls.  Hilton notes that Americans 
were consistently on the black market, but does not proceed further; her study examines 
American attempts to control the proliferation of illicit trade.  Grossman argues that 
preferential access to Allied goods placed them in a superior position for conducting 
black marketeering, but noted that it was Germans who bought or bartered form 
displaced persons, often to their mutual benefit.  Fritz also places the black market in the 
context of a contest between Germans and displaced persons.  Americans have not been 
assigned a systemic function in the perpetuation of a postwar black market.  Americans 
are bit players, whereby they conduct their business, and then leave the market, leaving 
the arena to Germans and displaced persons.  Only Rundell has demonstrated that 
Americans were enthusiastic participants in the black market, as they exploited 
inadequate and poorly enforced currency controls to their advantage.140   
This thesis has assigned such a function to the Americans.  Both the intelligence 
report drafted from the Hutchison interview and Lucius Clay’s pointed letter to 
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American troops stationed in Berlin indicate that Americans were using their positions 
as occupiers and the wealth that they commanded in rations, cigarettes and dollars, to 
operate on the black market in large numbers.  In France, trades with Americans had left 
French citizens with so much excess currency that the government issued bonds to buy it 
back.  Americans in Berlin stole items from their billets—perhaps some of this total was 
sent back home, some retained on the soldier’s person, and still other items were likely 
diverted to the black market for barter or sale; whatever its final disposition, property 
seizure had reached such proportions that the Deputy Military Governor felt compelled 
to issue a prohibitory circular to all troops in the Berlin sector.  In both instances, the 
response of authorities to each circumstance testified to widespread illicit activity.  
Americans acted as suppliers of illicit American goods to Germans and displaced 
persons.  Americans engaged in three types of illicit activity: supply by way of the black 
market, supply by way of misappropriation of US Army food and materiel, and supply 
by way of theft from American installations by Germans and displaced persons. 
American supply of illicit American goods was thus central to the existence of 
the black market in Germany and to the survival of Germans and displaced persons.  
Because the licit economy was plagued by shortages and an ineffective distribution 
system, the black market existed as the only viable economy.  American cigarettes 
became a de facto currency; they were the preferred fungible medium for conducting 
black market transactions.  Without Americans dealing in cigarettes for black market 
transactions, the black market would become a barter economy, as people found 
themselves unable to purchase goods for want of “cash.”  In the midst of the pervasive 
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scarcity that obtained in postwar Germany, the most valuable commodity was food, to 
which Americans had cheap and reliable access in abundance.  Because those who had 
access to this commodity were young men, women were able to leverage their sexuality 
in exchange for some form of intimate relationship with an American.  Americans were 
induced to provide food as a condition of this companionship.  Americans did not need 
to resort to the black market, but misappropriated foodstuffs duly provided them by the 
US Army.  This thesis has examined misappropriation as a form of illicit supply in the 
context of scarcity and fraternization between indigenous women and American men.  
Americans only gave up their food to women, and this required the presence of some 
gradation of intimate relationship.  In the absence of these relationships, without their 
American-supplied food, it is reasonable to assert that some women—and children—
would have starved and died.  Whether or not Americans were available for black 
market trade or a sexual relationship, demand remained for all manner of goods.  
Providing an agency generally not available to them in black market transactions and 
relationships with Americans, Germans and displaced persons could also meet demand 
for contraband articles on the black market through larceny from American installations.  
While this imparted agency to individual actors, ultimately, these thieves depended upon 
an American presence to supply the contraband goods to buyers on the black market—
without an American presence in the first instance, there would be no goods to steal, and 
hence, no source of supply from which the indigenous population might acquire 
household necessaries unobtainable on the licit economy.  
  
133
The historiography maintains that the black market was a German experience and 
that Germans and displaced persons mediated and negotiated within it as part of a ritual 
of survival.  Within the historiography, Americans are absent as a force on the black 
market.  This thesis demonstrates that in fact, Americans fulfilled a specific systemic 
function as suppliers, on and off the market, to the indigenous population.  At least in 
their zone, Americans were largely responsible for supplying the indigenous population 
with scarce luxuries and necessities.                                     
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